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 The purpose of this research is to address how the issue of masculinity functioned in 
British propaganda during the First World War, and how it affected individuals. Propaganda 
relied on prewar conceptions of masculinity to appeal to audiences for reasons such as enlistment 
or continued support for the war. Propaganda often amplified these conceptions of prewar 
masculinity, and men would internalize propaganda’s message. The British state, however, did 
not create propaganda uniformly, and there existed major differences between the goals of 
propaganda posters and propaganda films. It will be demonstrated that posters and film 
addressed separate issues despite reaching similar audiences, and that posters were more 
successful at affecting men’s sense of masculinity. Through showing how propaganda posters 
resonated with individuals, this paper highlights and reassesses the impact the propaganda poster 
























 The Catholic Church coined the term propaganda in the sixteenth century. Pope Gregory 
XV established the practice of de propaganda fide, the process by which priests and missionaries 
would propagate the Catholic faith throughout the world. By the time of the First World War, 
propaganda became the rationalized process undertaken by the government and private 
organizations to recruit for the war, justify the war, and manipulate public opinion towards 
continued support for the war.1 Technological advancement had also made it possible for 
propaganda to reach a mass audience. Mass-produced posters calling for enlistment covered 
walls, and films supporting the war played in cinemas throughout Britain. These mass visual 
forces of propaganda often relied on gendered content, particularly a version of masculinity 
developed in the Victorian era, to achieve the goals of recruitment or justification for the war. 
Propaganda spoke to men through a variety of ways such as appealing to their role as protectors 
of women and children, or shaming them as cowards for not enlisting. Propaganda tended to 
amplify the gender roles that had been established for men, and ultimately it helped to reinforce 
male gender roles because its appeals and coercive tactics deeply affected many men.  
 The ideology of separate spheres, a concept rooted in the Enlightenment but fully 
articulated in the Victorian era, defined British gender roles into the late-nineteenth century and 
beyond. Men were in charge of public life while women were in charge of domestic life. 
Separate-sphere ideology dictated certain cultural characteristics that defined men and women’s 
roles. Joanna Bourke writes, “The womanly woman was gentle, domesticated and virginal: the 
                                                 
1 Cate Haste, Keep the Home Fire Burning: Propaganda in the First World War (London: Allen 
Lane, 1977: 2.  
  2
manly man was athletic, stoical and courageous.”2 These traits were celebrated and respected. In 
Coventry Patmore’s poem “The Angel in the House,” an exemplary woman obeyed her husband 
and ran a successful household. Women were the physical embodiment of moral good. The angel 
was also worth protecting, and protection of the domestic home fell to men. John Tosh 
demonstrates how the domestic sphere was integral to Victorian definitions of masculinity 
because establishing and protecting a home was central to a man’s “good standing” with his 
peers.3  British people strove for the ideal of manly men and womanly women, and they each 
knew the other’s place.  
 Masculinity meant more than just a man publicly protecting his wife and home. It was 
also deeply intertwined with Christianity; as David Alderson has claimed, “manliness, then, was 
bound up with the protestant emphasis on autonomy in the pursuit of virtue.”4 British men sought 
a conscientious life of obedience to piety. That search, however, was aggressive and muscular. 
Muscular Christianity focused on strength and the creation of a fit, virulent Christian gentleman. 
This concept took hold  in the mid-nineteenth century, and it continued to shape British norms of 
behavior into the twentieth. Men like the clergyman Charles Kingsley helped give muscular 
Christianity its dimensions. The British placed an emphasis on family life, and Kingsley 
considered unmarried men such as celibate monks to be “unnatural, unsexed, and especially 
feminine.”5 Many Victorians abhorred effeminate men.6 Another important dimension to 
                                                 
2 Joanna Bourke, Dismembering the Male: Men’s Bodies, Britain and the Great War (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1996): 12-13.  
3 John Tosh, A Man’s Place: Masculinity and the Middle-Class Home in Victorian England 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999): 4.  
4 David Alderson, Mansex Fine: Religion, Manliness and Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century 
British Culture (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998): 15.  
5 Patricia Anderson, When Passion Reigned: Sex and the Victorians (New York: Basic Books, 
1995): 55. 
6 Ibid.  
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muscular Christianity was an emphasis on sports, fitness, and playing games. The Victorians and 
Edwardians associated creation of strong bodies with the creation of strong morals.  
 The Victorian focus on athleticism and virility led to the institutionalization of sports, 
health, and physical fitness. This emphasis initially emerged from the public schools where 
physical exercise was considered essential to a “whole” man, and from the 1860s on 
“compulsory games were introduced and an intense enthusiasm on the part of many pupils 
became evident.”7 The public schools, however, were for elite children, and the association with 
athleticism and masculinity was not present throughout the lower classes of British society until 
compulsory schooling began in 1880. By the late nineteenth century state schools made 
provisions for playing fields to help poorer boys adopt “masculine traits.”8 The Boer War then 
helped fuel a national focus on fitness because so many of the men who volunteered where not 
fit enough for service.9 Entire organizations such as the League of Health and Strength emerged 
to help men with their lack of physical ability. Founded in 1906, the League members pledged 
themselves “to forward the cause of physical culture, to take judicious exercise daily, to 
encourage fitness in others… For them, the body was to be built, or finely tuned.”10 There was 
also of course the Boy Scouts founded by Robert Baden-Powell in 1907 to “give manliness a 
popular dimension amongst boys and young men.”11 Athleticism, fitness, and virility would all 
play important roles in the war and in propaganda.   
                                                 
7 J.A. Mangan Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School: The Emergence and 
Consolidation of an Educational Ideology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981): 68. 
8 Bourke, Dismembering,13.  
9 Ibid. 
10 Joanna Bourke, Working-Class Cultures in Britain, 1890-1960 (London: Routledge, 1994): 
42-43. 
11 Allen Warren, “Popular Manliness: Baden-Powell, Scouting, and the Development of Manly 
Character,” in Manliness and Morality: Middle-Class Masculinity in Britain and America, eds. 
J.A. Mangan and James Walvin (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987): 200.  
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 Masculinity was not a static phenomenon, and the turn of the twentieth century created 
anxieties about the place of men and women. New class orders, new urban landscapes, and new 
sexualities threatened traditional and conservative values. Movements like feminism threatened 
the social order, and organizations like the Women’s Social and Political Union “seemed to 
confirm that the degeneracy of the race was not restricted to the working classes and poor.”12 
The trial of Oscar Wilde scandalized society, and it brought the specter of homosexuality out of 
the shadows. The Victorians and Edwardians considered homosexuality to be a serious  
perversion that carried with it “an inherent charge of lack of manliness.”13 After the Wilde trial, 
too, homosexuality became synonymous with effeminacy.14 These issues contributed to a general 
sense of malaise that permeated fin-de-siècle Britain. Many men felt the need to escape from a 
society they felt was corrosive or suffocating. Michael Adams utilizes the J. M. Barrie quotation 
from Peter Pan to exemplify the masculine attitudes that existed before the war: “’To die will be 
an awfully big adventure.”15 Barrie published Peter Pan in 1904, and the book exemplified the 
lesson of dying well through adventures and playing games. Even Hook, the pirate villain, “is at 
his best at the end.”16  
                                                 
12 Susan Kingsley Kent, Gender and Power in Britain, 1640-1990 (London: Routledge, 1999): 
269 
13 Alderson, Mansex 81.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Michael C. C. Adams, The Great Adventure: Male Desire and the Coming of World War I 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1990): iii. J. M. Barrie actually commented 
about the effect of propaganda on gender attitudes in a play about the war he published in 1920 
titled “Echoes of the War.” There is a scene where a soldier confronts a woman about her 
invention of a heroic son. She does not have a son, but wants people to believe she is the mother 
to a masculine hero. The soldier asks, “How could it affect you?” and the woman replies, “Oh 
mister, that’s the thing. It didn’t affect me. It affected everybody but me… Even the posters on 
the walls, of the woman saying ‘Go, my boy,’ leered at me. I sometimes cried by myself in the 
dark.”  
16 Ibid., 87. 
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War itself became the greatest manifestation of masculinity. It offered men a way to have 
adventure, put their fitness on trial, and protect women. The state encouraged this offer, and “the 
reassertion of traditional masculinity and femininity, and of separate spheres for men and 
women, found expression in the efforts to legitimate and justify the war itself.”17 War 
represented masculinity, and the British state used masculinity to propagate the war. 
Propagandists did not invent the concepts of masculinity they used. They took what already 
existed in British society, amplified it, and used it to appeal, coerce, shame, or otherwise 
manipulate men into the war effort. Propaganda was also successful at resonating with men. 
They responded to the propaganda messages, and it affected their sense of masculinity and their 
























                                                 
17 Kingsley Kent, Gender, 273.  
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2. MASCULINITY IN BRITISH PROPAGANDA POSTERS DURING THE FIRST 
WORLD WAR 
 
 At the outbreak of the First World War, Britain had the smallest standing army of all the 
major belligerent nations. Committed to a volunteer force, the British in August of 1914 faced 
the pressing task of raising a large enough army. In an effort to swell the military’s ranks, H. H. 
Asquith’s Liberal Government erected several state apparatuses to produce propaganda. The 
most important office was the Parliamentary Recruitment Committee (or PRC). The PRC created 
a staggering amount of propaganda during its 16-month existence. They issued 54 million 
posters, 5.8 million leaflets and pamphlets, organized 12,000 meetings, and arranged 20,000 
speeches.18 Posters, which comprised the bulk of propaganda, bombarded the public with various 
images and messages compelling men to enlist. The purpose of the British propaganda poster 
during World War I was to instill the interests of the state within the subject, such as convincing 
men to enlist for the army. The posters were successful, and a significant proportion of the 
posters relied on images and messages of masculinity to achieve its purpose. The logic of many 
posters followed the logic that men were to protect their home, their nation, and the fragile 
women and children left behind in both. Any British man who did not fulfill his masculine duty 
was no man at all.  
 According to Cate Haste and Philip Taylor, British propaganda only appeared under the 
conditions of the First World War.19 It is true that home government propaganda was scarce 
before the war, but it was not nonexistent: “Imperial propaganda was the one area of official 
                                                 
18 Alan G. V. Simmonds, Britain and World War One (New York: Routledge Publishing, 2012): 
47. 
19 John M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 
1880-1960 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984): 2. 
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propagandist activity which seemed to be generally acceptable.”20 Politicians used propaganda at 
home without complaint from the public. Imperial propaganda took many forms from older 
vehicles of transmission such as newspapers, and newer ones such as photographs. Propagandists 
used posters, but they were not common. The most successful modes of propaganda were 
postcards and cigarette cards. It appears the poster was not employed for large-scale propaganda 
purposes until the beginning of the First World War.  
A relatively recent invention, the poster emerged from the reduction of paper’s cost 
during the mid-nineteenth century. Advertisers were the first to use posters on a significant scale, 
beginning in the 1860s when “posters could be run off at the rate of 10,000 an hour at 
extraordinarily low cost.”21 By the early twentieth century, cities were covered in variously 
themed posters. Robert Roberts writes in The Classic Slum about “a culture of the streets,” where 
“one soaked in information of every kind from posters and advertisements pasted on gable end 
and massive hoarding.”22 Roberts’ description also uncovers precisely why posters were so 
important: they filled public space and subjects could not avoid the posters’ messages. Posters 
reached people in a way that pamphlets, newspapers, and even radio or cinema could not.  
Posters were not the exclusive purview of advertisers before the War. Politicians used 
posters extensively for campaign purposes or on behalf of a political cause. Periodicals of the 
time frequently noted the relationship between political propaganda and posters. In an article 
about German politics of 1907, a contributor to The English Review mentioned posters as part of 
Wilhelm II’s anti-socialist propaganda campaign:, ‘He [Kaiser Wilhelm] appealed to Germans to 
think imperially, to vote for the new naval programmes; and for the first time went ‘on the 
                                                 
20 MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire, 2. 
21 Ibid., 19.  
22 Robert Roberts, The Classic Slum: Salford Life in the First Quarter of the Century 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1971), 168.  
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stump,’ as we do in England, with speeches and a big poster campaign.”23 In 1910, radical free 
trade advocates used propaganda posters on behalf of tariff reform for the coca trade.24 Political 
posters became such a scourge that W. H. Wiseman wrote an impassioned polemic against them 
and their  “utilization of every available space on our walls and hoardings.”25 He argued that 
posters were devoid of educational value, and that no meaningful political truth could be 
conveyed with an image and a slogan. More dangerously, the party with the most funds could 
obtain a monopoly on space, and “reap some advantage from the impression made on the minds 
of the weak and ignorant.”26 Wiseman’s reasoning led him to fear political propaganda posters 
for their demagogy and manipulation of the public’s fears. The poster’s purpose was to convince 
by means of emotional appeal.  
The state-sanctioned propaganda of World War I more fully embraced the emotional 
appeals that Wiseman loathed. The conditions of the war provided the state with a monopoly on 
public space for propaganda, and a poster with an image and a slogan was the standard template 
for the propaganda poster. It was an effective means of convincing men to leave their lives and 
homes for a fight they did not fully understand. Charles Masterman, an architect of British 
propaganda, summarized the problem: 
Men volunteered or were pressed into the armies and shipped over the sea in millions  
who otherwise would never have seen the sea or visited foreign lands or left their native 
town. They owned no portion of the land from which they had gone… And at the end 
they came home also in millions again, also without owning any piece of their own land, 
to take up the thread of life which had been so rudely snapped by service they had 
previously regarded as incredible. A friend of mine heard fragments of conversation 
between a bus conductor and a passenger. The conductor had fought through the war and 
                                                 
23 “The Collapse of Socialism,” The English Review, 1908-1937 (November 11, 1914): 459.  
24 “Notes of the Week,” Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science, and Art 110 (July 9, 
1910): 36.  
25 W.H. Wiseman, “Some Proposals for a reform in our Methods of Conducting Parliamentary 
Elections,” Westminster Review 178 (August, 1912): 126.  
26 Ibid. 
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become a Sergeant-Major: “But that’s not to say that I liked it.” In reply to some patriotic 
platitude he burst out fiercely: “I don’t see that it is my country. I don’t own a thing in 
it.”27 
 
One of the chief questions propagandists faced was how to convince the working class and 
middle class alike to give their lives for Britain. One of the more popular ways they sought to 
achieve this goal was through attacks on men’s very bodies, roles, and self-image. Propaganda 
posters operated according to gendered assumption of what it meant to be a man. No poster 
elucidated “great political truths;” they did not list the intricacies of the ententes and alliances, 
nor did they expose the dealings of the foreign office. The purpose of those posters was to 
convince and often shame the unenlisted man into service via gendered messages.  They 
frequently implied that the man who did not enlist was a coward.  
 The PRC created a staggering amount of propaganda during the war. The PRC estimated 
they printed 12.5 million copies of 164 different posters.28. Propaganda posters were inescapable: 
“These materials blanketed the nation, covering walls, windows, hoardings, tramcars, taxis, and 
kiosks in urban and rural areas alike.”29 Sub-departments of the PRC in local constituencies were 
responsible for the actual business of physically hanging the posters.30 Poster images and 
messages could be found reproduced in newspapers or on postcards, but they were primarily 
hung in open, public spaces--in banks, libraries, clubs, shops, “and anywhere the public might 
                                                 
27 Charles F. G. Masterman, England After the War (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 
1923): 5.  
28 M. L. Sanders and Philip M. Taylor British Propaganda during the First World War, 1914-
1918 (London: Macmillan, 1982): 103 
29 Meg Albrinck, “Humanitarians and He-Men: Recruitment Posters and the Masculine 
Ideal,” in Picture This: World War I Posters and Visual Culture, ed. Pearl James (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2009): 312. 
30 Sanders and Taylor, 103.  
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gather in large numbers.”31 The PRC was responsible for the producing the greatest number of 
posters before conscription came into effect with the Military Service Act of March 2, 1916.The 
PRC then dissolved, but its work was “effectively continued” by the National War Aims Council 
(or NWAC) for the remainder of the war, although on a smaller scale.32  
There has been much work done on gender and British World War I propaganda. Meg 
Albrinick’s work focuses on men and masculinity. Albrinck shows how British propaganda 
appealed to men vis-à-vis traditions of courage, honor, glory, but, also how it utilized “shame 
and coercion to question the virility of the unenlisted man.”33 Michele Shover argues the posters 
of women reflected an assumption that women were to have “a war effort role… that was 
thoroughly traditional.”34 While women did leave for the factories to work, the British 
government wanted to preserve their “innately passive natures.”35 These arguments fit into a 
larger historiographical debate about the impact of World War I on British society. Arthur 
Marwick represented the war as a great flood that ushered in sweeping, positive changes in 
British society in his work The Deluge: British Society and the First World War. Gerard 
DeGroot, however, insisted that the war  “was not a deluge which swept all before it, but at best 
a winter storm which swelled the rivers of change.”36 Research on the issue of masculinity and 
gender in British propaganda supports DeGroot’s argument, and takes it a step further. 
Propaganda did not even help to swell the rivers of change happening in gender relations. It had 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 104.  
32 Sanders and Taylor, 105 
33Albrinck, “Humanitarians and He-Men,”, 314. 
34 Michele J. Shover, “Roles and Images of Women in World War I Propaganda,” Politics and 
Society 5, no. 4 (December 1975), 471-472.  
35 Ibid., 469. 
36 Gerard J. DeGroot, Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War (London: Longman, 
1996): 291.  
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a conservative effect on gender relations, or, to continue the metaphor, it dammed up the rivers 
of change. Propaganda helped to reinforce the prewar gender roles in British society.  
Louis Althusser’s ideas on ideology and interpellation help us understand the impact of 
British World War I propaganda. Concerned with the reproduction of the relations of production, 
Althusser sought to explain how a Marxist understanding of labor-power relations (the 
exploitation of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie) was “integrated into our everyday 
consciousness.”37 Althusser argues that "ideology represents the imaginary relationship of 
individuals to their real conditions of existence” and that “ideology has a material existence.”38 
British propaganda posters were the material existence of a gender ideology of masculinity and 
femininity. The images and messages on the posters framed the imagined relationship of 
individuals to their real conditions of existence. The posters, moreover, operate according to 
Althusser’s idea of interpellation. Subjects do not create ideology, but rather the other way 
around: “I shall then suggest that ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ 
subjects among the individuals… or ‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects (it transforms them 
all) by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation.”39 The poster “calls” to 
individuals who are then transformed into the subject of the poster’s ideology. Althusser 
provides an example of what he means by analogy of a policeman hailing an individual by 
shouting, ‘Hey, you there!”40 When the individual turns to the policeman, he has acknowledged 
that he is the subject the policeman hailed. The individual becomes a subject whose agency 
                                                 
37 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes Towards an 
Investigation,” in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays trans. Andy Blunden (New York: 






depends on the relationship established by the policeman. Similarly, the unenlisted man became 
a subject of the propaganda poster’s call to fight. This theoretical framework is similar to the one 
utilized by Jim Aulich and John Hewitt in their Seduction or Instruction? First World War 
Posters in Britain and Europe. They are not concerned with gender, but they do lay out the 
function of the poster: “In Britain, the state controlled the production of posters along 
propagandistic lines to construct a citizenry with in particular national histories.”41  
  The PRC created the British propaganda posters of the First World War with different 
goals in mind. Some posters aimed to entice the public to buy war bonds, or to contribute to the 
home front; most, however, sought to persuade men to enlist. The posters often attempted to 
recruit men through shame and humiliation.42 Propaganda posters, though, also aimed to recruit 
women for the war effort. Shover proposed two categories for women in propaganda: service 
roles and symbolic roles. Service role propaganda sought to enlist women to buy war bonds or to 
work as nurses. Symbolic role propaganda depicted women as the spirit of war. Shover states, 
“Real women cannot identify with their [the symbolic figures’] grand scale, their implacable 
force, their devastating compulsion.” 43 She is correct, but she is correct about women and men. 
While women could not identify with the image as real women, real men identified women as 
the reason to fight. It is important to note that propaganda oppressed men and women alike.44 
Shover examines propaganda in relation to femininity, but the symbolic role of women in 
propaganda also had important implications for masculinity. Women were potent symbols for 
men in propaganda posters. Some posters persuaded men to fight on behalf of a nation 
                                                 
41 Jim Aulich and John Hewitt, Seduction or Instruction? First World War Posters in Britain and 
Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007): 3.  
42 Simmonds, Britain and World War One, 45. 
43 Shover, “Roles and Images,” 479-481.  
44 Joanna Bourke, Dismembering the Male: Men’s Bodies, Britain, and the Great War (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1996): 14.  
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personified as a woman. In Shover’s discussion of the symbolic role of women, a category of 
propaganda posters for men can be identified. Propaganda posters frequently employed symbolic 
women to compel men to fight. Furthermore, the category of symbolic women included mothers 
and wives, not simply mythic women as the essence of war. Men were to fulfill their identities as 
masculine protectors of passive women incapable of fighting for themselves. Propaganda posters 
presented the war as means to protect the nation and the home front, which were often both 
symbolized as feminine. But even posters that did not explicitly include images of women still 
relied on gendered logic that men who did not enlist were unmasculine, shameful cowards. 
The first posters, however, did not rely on such imagery and tactics. It was not an obvious 
truth when fighting began that the posters would be an effective means of recruitment. The first 
major poster campaign launched by the PRC changed that--and arguably produced the most 
iconic piece of propaganda ever made. It was the imposing image of Lord Kitchener 
authoritatively pointing at the viewer, and demanding that men enlist in the armies of Britain. 
Kitchener was already a famous general in Britain for winning the Battle of Omdurman in the 
Sudan in 1898 and for his exploits in the Boer War. When World War I began, he was the 
Secretary of State for War. Alfred Leete designed the famous image, one that would prove so 
instrumental in the propaganda machine. It first appeared as a magazine cover for the London 
Opinion a month after the war broke out on September 5, 1914.45 The cover showed Kitchener 
pointing accusingly and demanding he “Wants YOU.” The image of Kitchener was a visual 
force. The stern face and his authoritative command was the picture of the British “stiff upper 
lip.” Yet Leete’s Kitchener image was never actually used as a propaganda poster. A limited run 
of postcards bore the Leete image, but it never appeared on a poster, although it was mistakenly 
                                                 
45 Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, xi.  
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filed as such in 1917 in the Imperial War Museum. James Taylor likens the phenomenon to the 
present day phenomenon of the World War II propaganda poster urging Londoners “To Keep 
Calm and Carry on.”46 According to Taylor, the memory of the Leete image as a famous poster 
that blanketed walls was never actually a reality.  
Nevertheless, Kitchener’s visage and various commands to enlist did feature on 
extremely popular propaganda posters. Kitchener’s stern face made him a “figure of absolute 
will and power, an image of British masculinity.”47 Kitchener commanded men via poster 
throughout Britain, and “it became progressively harder for a man to stand back when more and 
more of his friends and neighbors were seen to be joining up.”48 As one recruit put it, “The 
accusing finger of Kitchener stabbed me at every corner.”49 By 1915, Manchester was 
“plentifully bespattered with Lord Kitchener’s latest poster calling for workers.”50A very large 
poster of Kitchener headed “Kitchener’s Army; Join at Once” hung near the British War 
Office.51 A woman in Glasgow even attributed direct causation to one of Kitchener’s posters: 
She recalled that her husband “had enlisted after seeing Lord Kitchener’s poster proclaiming ‘I 
Want You.’”52 While the Leete image may not have featured on a propaganda poster, 
Kitchener’s face certainly did. Kitchener posters did exist, and they did affect men. A man in 
1916 wrote, “The earliest Kitchener’s Army recruiting poster invited men to ‘enlist for the 
                                                 
46 James Taylor, Your Country Needs You: the Secret History of the Propaganda Poster 
(Glasgow: Saraband Press, 2013). See Also: Nicholas Hiley, “’Kitchener Wants You’ and 
‘Daddy, what did YOU do in the Great War:’ The Myth of British Recruiting Posters,” Imperial 
War Museum review 11 (1999): 40-58. The Leete image served as the model for the famous 
American poster “Uncle Sam Wants You.” 
47 Jane Tynan, British Army Uniform and the First World War: Men in Khaki (London: Palgrave 
Macmillian, 2013): 35.  
48 Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, 186.  
49 Ibid., 172.  
50  Manchester Evening News April 12, 1915. Emphasis placed by author. 
51 Birmingham Daily Mail July 22, 1915.  
52 Glasgow Daily Record April 11, 1916.  
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duration of the war.’ This phrase, shouting out from every available wall-space, gradually came 
to affect all of us subconsciously.”53  
The British Government saw the power recruiting posters could have. Every poster then 
carried the authoritative weight of Kitchener and the PRC: “the PRC’s materials made use of 
authoritative speakers and authoritative content. They bore the stamp of the PRC and often 
employed images or quotations from state representatives… thus presenting their arguments as 
institutional truths.”54  The PRC created a wide variety of posters, and they all carried the 
authority of the state. Not all of the posters, however, relied on such blunt imagery like a portrait 
of a state official. Posters contained a wide variety of images and slogans.  
British posters drew heavily on images from Britain’s actual and mythic past. Some of 
the earliest posters depicted Lord Nelson, stiff-backed and imposing. In the poster, Nelson 
exuded commanding and authoritative presence not unlike that found in the Kitchener image. 
The words at the top of the poster read “England Expects.” The line came from the Battle of 
Trafalgar when Lord Nelson signaled to all his men, “England expects that every man will do his 
duty.”55 Duty meant that strong and courageous men, no matter what their occupation or class, 
would be willing to die for England, if need be.  That sentiment is reflected at the bottom with a 
line that asks, “Are you Doing Your Duty Today?” Nelson appears in several other posters as 
well. In a poster not even explicitly devoted to enlistment, Nelson, with a glorious fleet of ships 
behind him, stares out at the viewer.56 The type of ship depicted had been made obsolete by the 
                                                 
53 R. Page Arnot, “The War and Wages,” Athenaeum 46 (Nov. 1916): vii. See Chapter 3 for a 
more in-depth examination of how propaganda affected men, and how men internalized 
propaganda  
54 Albrinck, “Humanitarians and He-Men,” 315. 
55 William Franks, England Expects, Ball State University Digital Media Repository, ca. 1915. 
See illustration 1.   
56 Ibid. See illustration 2.  
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creation of the Dreadnaught in 1906, but it was more important to depict the glory of Britain’s 
past than to present the contemporary technology. Another recruitment poster simply showcased 
those obsolete ships. It utilized the same “England Expects” motif while going further to 
command that “England must not and will not be disappointed.”57 The reliance on shame was 
obvious. It told the male viewer he was the potential source for England’s disappointment. The 
appeal to Nelson seemed to resonate with the public. Only two months after the war began, there 
were revivals of plays about Nelson’s life.58 The propaganda projected an indication that the war 
of 1914 would be little different than the Napoleonic wars where the glory of England prevailed 
above all.  
Perhaps the most overt example that employed the use of Britain’s past was a poster that 
read simply, “Britain needs you at once.”59 This poster did not depict any actual heroes from 
Britain’s history, but rather a truly mythic figure. The image was of St. George slaying the 
dragon. Outfitted in full medieval armor upon a rearing horse, George plunges his lance into the 
heart of the dragon. This medievalist image resonated in British society, in large part because of 
the impact of “muscular Christianity” and its celebration of “chivalric elitism.”60 Combining 
evangelical virtue and male vitality, muscular Christianity stressed “aggressive spirituality and 
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physical prowess.”61 Moreover, the images associated with medievalism worked well on 
propaganda posters because they reminded people “always, man’s role is to fight.”62  The main 
message of the poster was that Britain needed brave men like St. George. The poster did not 
explicitly rely on shame, but it did draw continuity from a mythical military and religious past to 
the present for the glory of Britain. It was a unique instance where the poster could appeal to 
men’s gender without resulting to coercion or demands of duty. It was also a useful way to “talk 
about killing without appearing barbaric.”63 Men would be going to kill dragons, not Germans or 
Turks. The imagery provided men with the romantic ideal of a Christian warrior rather than the 
reality of twentieth-century warfare. This type of image also influenced other idealized forms of 
British warfare and masculinity, and it was a prime example of prewar gender sentiments being 
amplified by propaganda.  
 The storied cavalry charge also appeared frequently in British propaganda posters. A 
notable example presented a nameless warrior perched upon the back of great, galloping beast of 
a horse. The stoic soldier held himself steady with his sword outstretched, presumably charging 
into battle. He was alone in the poster. Words sparsely framed the scene. Only one word in bold 
appeared at the top of the image: “Forward!” At the bottom, there was only a simple command: 
“Enlist Now”.64 The average man looking to enlist knew he would not be part of the cavalry, but 
the poster reinforced and relied upon a heroic and masculine vision of war. There is also the 
element of instruction in this poster. The poster projects “an ideological position that made 
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equivalences of national interest, communal solidarity, and personal happiness.”65 The war 
would be fought and won by valiant individuals sallying forth with sword outstretched towards 
the evil German enemy. A soldier could heed the forward call, safe in the knowledge of his own 
bravery and the bravery of his commanding officer. These heroes moved forward so that what 
stayed behind was safe. Part of what stayed behind, part of what the courageous men were going 
to die for, were women and the roles they represented. The posters did not implore men to fight 
so women could supplement the role men played in British society and culture. The posters did 
not promise a fight for change. They simply demanded that men enlist and fight.  
 Another poster that presented images of the cavalry showcased the charge in action. In 
this one, a group of men were ride into battle. The action shot captured dashing soldiers on their 
steeds, navigating the peril of battle. To the right of the charge a shell explodes. The man nearest 
to the blast directs his rearing horse from the danger. The soldier to the left bravely reaches out 
to protect his brother in arms. It appears as if the men are playing a game; the scene (sans 
explosions and uniforms) could easily be transplanted onto a polo field. The top of the poster 
commands, “To the Front.” The bottom of the poster reads, “Every fit Briton should join our 
brave men at the front.”66 There was still the element of shame by the poster’s implication that if 
a soldier had not joined then he was not brave or fit, but it used the mythic cavalry charge to 
demonstrate that the war could have an element of adventure.  Interestingly, there is again the 
discrepancy between the elite imagery and the appeal to “every fit Briton.” The word “fit” is 
important to note here. The logic of shame could be understood two ways in this poster. First, 
those who did not enlist were not brave, but second, those who were not fit should not sign up. 
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Those who were not fit – the “ragged poor” who were “lighter and leaner” than the middle and 
upper classes – did not even have the chance to be brave.67 The shame of their bodies 
compounded the shame of their cowardice. Indeed, Albrinck recounts the story of a man too 
unfit for service who “’hunts up his old dumbbells’ in order to shape his body into the form 
required by the War Office.”68 
 The cavalry charge and other visions of masculine bravery in warfare belonged to a 
category of propaganda that wished to exploit the supposed camaraderie fostered by the war. 
Posters did not always celebrate heroic charges of sport-like challenges, however. The posters 
often used existing bonds among the lower classes, such as those fostered by the Pals Battalions, 
to shame those who had yet to enlist. The Pals Battalions were an initiative to help men enlist 
with other men from their same area and social group. Deep class divisions marked Britain, and 
it was a comfort to many volunteers that “they would not go into combat alongside other social 
groups.”69 Indeed, class defined these units, but there was another element lurking beneath the 
class division. The various classes formed groups unto themselves, but the Pals Battalions also 
had a dimension of masculinity. A 1915 image queries the viewer, “You’re proud of your pals in 
the army of course, but what will your pals think of YOU? Think it over!”70 Clearly the intended 
answer to the question was that the viewer’s pals would see him as a coward. Questions like 
these frequently appeared in propaganda. One poster asked the viewer, “Why are you stopping 
here when your pals are out there?”71 The question posed by the poster forced the viewer to 
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consider his literal, physical position in the world, and it confronted him with the reality that he 
was not “over there.” Another poster showed a fellow soldier offering his hand. The poster 
informed the unenlisted man, “Your pal in the trenches is waiting to shake your hand.”72 Here 
the wartime government assured the viewer a braver man waited in the trenches. All the viewer 
had to do was shake the braver man’s hand to become brave himself. Of course, to do that the 
man would first have to enlist. The message was a form of coercion. As Albrinck noes, “the 
implication is that a true man would be ashamed to face his peers in anything but khaki.”73 
Propaganda posters frequently accused the unenlisted man of not being a man, or being less than 
a man. 
   Women played an important role in the government’s program to shame men into 
enlisting. Women appeared as both the cause for enlisting and the reason to fight.  One war 
bonds poster presents a soldier all in khaki, ready for the front, while his wife stands next to him 
in a fancy black dress, heels, a hat, and a fur shawl. The title of the piece is “For Her!”74 The idea 
that men fought for women at home, shopping and filling any flight of fancy, would prove to be 
a source of division after the war. But the idea of fighting “for” women or children (often 
combined together) was common. The poster “The Call of the Women” best epitomized this 
idea. The poster depicted a pretty English mother clutching her daughter (or, perhaps, an 
androgynous boy) tight to her chest. Her eyes are wet and pleading, and she tells soldiers to, 
“Save us from the Hun.”75 The poster communicated to men that to enlist and fight meant saving 
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British women and children from the evil and corrupting barbarity of the Germans. Furthermore, 
the poster operated according to a logic of shame. The man who did not go to the front to save 
women and children was no man at all. He was a coward.  
 The idea of protecting women from the Germans was a popular feature of propaganda. 
As well as drawing on a mythic past for propaganda, the British also drew upon an idealized 
vision of the British nation. It was the world of Tintern Abbey and the Cotswolds. A 1914 poster 
presented “a bit of England” and “a bit of Belgium” as two images side by side. The bit of 
England was an idyllic village populated with pretty women, the elderly, and children. The bit of 
Belgium was a destroyed city block with refugees emerging from the rubble. The implication 
was that the Germans would do to England what they had done to Belgium. Albrinck states that 
the intent with the “Remember Belgium” campaign was to “remember the immorality of the 
Germans.”76 The village was a device to remind men that the pure and virginal nation faced the 
violent penetration of the Germans. The poster was alliteratively titled “The Hun and the 
Home.”77 The image of England itself did not rely overtly on strict gender roles (save the fact 
there are no young men or male children in the “bit of England”), but the language employed by 
the poster demonstrates rigid gender division and it relies on language, again, devised to shame 
men who had not enlisted. The poster states that in England “our homes are secure, our mothers 
and wives safe, our children still play and fear no harm,” which stands in contrast to Belgium 
where “their homes are destroyed, their women are murdered and worse, their children are dead 
or slaves.” The poster was outwardly communicating to women as the bottom of the poster 
stated, “back up the men who have saved you.” Curiously, that was the only provision the poster 
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asked of women. It did not ask women to buy war bonds, support the war effort by working in a 
factory, or to save food and supplies for the front. It merely told women to “back up” the men 
who were fighting. Given that the PRC produced the poster before the advent of conscription, 
one wonders why Britain would ask for nothing else. The reason was that the poster was actually 
directed at getting men to enlist. The poster communicated to the male viewer that he was not 
one of the men securing homes, saving mothers and wives, and protecting an idyllic England 
where children could play. It also told the male viewer that, since he was not one of the men who 
had saved England from the fate of Belgium, he did not have the support and admiration of 
women. In other words, if he was not the man saving the world depicted in the poster then he 
was worthy only of contempt by the opposite sex.  
A poster from 1915 portrayed a father crying in a hospital next to his dead wife. She died 
in a zeppelin raid, and his young daughter said to him “but daddy, mother didn’t do anything 
wrong!”78 The image, superficially, is straightforward: fight to protect your wives and mothers. 
At a deeper level, though, there was the implication that this man was at home, safe in Britain 
and far from the front. If only he had been fulfilling his role as a man to defend his country his 
wife would still be alive. The daughter was not really telling the father “mother didn’t do 
anything wrong.” She was telling the father that he had done something wrong, and the poster, 
by extension, told the male viewer he was doing something wrong by not fighting. To shame 
men for doing something wrong was powerful. What they had done wrong was not fulfill a basic 
function of their gender role: protect their wives, the mothers of their children. One poster urged 
men to consider their situation: “Be honest with yourself. Be certain that your so-called reason is 
                                                 
78 Louis Raemaekers, But Daddy, Mother Didn’t do Anything Wrong, Ball State University 
Media Repository, ca. 1915. See Illustration 13.  
  23
not a selfish excuse. Enlist today.”79 Unsurprisingly, the poster does not provide any examples of 
reasons that would not be considered selfish.  
Female children frequently appeared in propaganda posters. It was the daughter, not the 
son, in a famous propaganda poster who asked her father what he had done during the war. 
Another poster from 1914 presented three cherubic female children. The caption is terse and to 
the point: “For your children.”80 The plea invokes the father’s duty to become a soldier. The 
implication is clear. If he does not become a soldier than he has failed as a father. The father in 
this poster embodies masculinity. The war illuminated his failings as a man; he could “not 
maintain his air of ‘manly authority’ once the wartime definition of masculinity begins to 
circulate in his community.” The recruiting poster communicated more that to simply remain a 
father was not enough to fulfill the role of protector.  
Some recruitment posters lacked all subtlety in what they meant to convey. One 
particular poster from 1915 had a very direct message for men who thought not enlisting was an 
option. The image was a silhouette of a presumably upper or middle class single man dressed in 
a tuxedo. His hand tussled hair above his furrowed brow, and the image was perhaps a somewhat 
subversive inference that the wealthy unenlisted man was effeminate. With a stressful look upon 
his face he thought to himself, “I should go, but!!!” He looked for any excuse imaginable, but 
Britain abided no excuses from any man. There was no promise of glory in the poster. There was 
nothing offered other than the expectation that men fought. Big, block letters stated to the 
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unenlisted man the truth of his gender: “you are no exception, join now.”81 No man was special 
enough to remain behind. The message was clear. Any man who chose not to fight, not to do 
what England expected, should feel shame and embarrassment for his cowardice.  
The nature of that poster was a product of the difficulty in finding resonant imagery to lay 
the responsibility of war at the single male’s feet. Single men did not have wives or children. It 
was harder to instill a sense of shame in them for the their failure to protect the vulnerable, and 
depictions of a mythic and heroic past would not work on every single man. The propaganda 
directed at single men rested on the simple assumption that duty to fight was an innate and 
essential feature of masculinity. A poster of 1915 was explicitly directed at single men. It stated, 
“Single men: hundreds of thousands of married men have left their homes to fight for King & 
Country, show your appreciation by following their noble example.”82 The poster simultaneously 
communicated to the single man that married men fulfilled their masculine duty even though 
they had something to lose, and that since they had something to lose their lives were more 
important than the life of a bachelor. The language, too, was striking because the poster did not 
acknowledge that a bachelor would fight so a married man could stay home. Britain expected all 
men to fight.  
The propaganda poster “Take up the Sword of Justice” best represented the mythic and 
masculine calls to fight as well as the feminine ideal for which the soldiers were fighting. The 
poster features a woman standing on water (presumably the English Channel) filled with dead 
and drowning bodies. Her arms are outstretched and her eyes look far away, incapable of dealing 
with the horrors that surround her. She holds a sword in her hand, and she pleads with the men 
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looking at the poster to take it and fight.83 The poster synthesized the symbolic image of women 
as the reason to fight with the call to fight by shaming the unenlisted man for the deaths that 
were occurring. There was another dimension, however, to this poster that was absolutely 
critical. It was no longer a dead woman or a fearful woman, but a woman actively commanding 
men to fight. The image of women began to represent not only the passive nation that needed 
defending, but also the active nation that commanded men to fight and to die. Posters like “Take 
Up the Sword of Justice” represented the PRC at its most coercive as voluntary recruitment 
could not satiate the war’s demand for male bodies, and the PRC moved towards more explicit 
tactics of shame and personal guilt.84  
The commanding woman appeared in other propaganda posters around the same time as 
the “Take up the Sword of Justice” poster. E. J. Kealey created a particularly famous one in 
1915. The poster features a woman peering longingly from her open bay window. Her family 
joins her for the view. The adolescent daughter clutches at her mother while she reassuringly 
touches the daughter’s hand. A small boy, whose face is not featured, firmly grasps his sister’s 
shawl with both hands. The mother holds her chin high. She is the picture of British resolve, and 
she has an air of weary stoicism about her. The object of her gaze is a column of khaki-clad 
soldiers marching over verdant hills. Perhaps as a macabre allusion to death, the soldiers march 
out of frame much like the actual soldiers at the actual front. The only message featured on the 
poster was a command from the women to the men: “Woman of Britain say ‘GO!’”85 Kingsbury 
interprets the poster as using women to recruit by “invoking men’s sense of duty to their 
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mothers.”86 Whether or not that was Kealey’s intention, the woman in the image knew where she 
commanded the men to go.  Men were to go to the front while women stayed in the home. 
An interesting feature of the image was its rigid gender divisions. By 1915, women had 
begun to fill factories and clerical jobs, but there was no indication in the image that those 
changes happening. The poster, in fact, held up the “separate-spheres” ideology of the pre-war 
period as its central theme. Public life was for men, and the domestic realm was for women. This 
separate-spheres ideology was supposed to be “a ‘supportive language’ allowing women to 
‘avoid conflicts’ between private and public values and work by emphasizing the capacity of the 
‘different attributes and skills’ of their ‘domestic background’ to ‘strengthen civic life.’”87 In the 
poster, however, the woman did not emphasize her domestic background, nor did she avoid 
conflict between the private and public life. Instead, safe behind her window in the realm of 
private life, she directed public life. Furthermore, propaganda had communicated to men the 
reason they were fighting was to protect the woman in the window.  
Some posters lacked images, and they instead relied entirely on text. While not as 
effective as more visually oriented posters, they still retained their function as ideology in the 
public space. Two notable examples were messages from the state to women. The first example 
was almost comically overt with its intent: 
To the Young Women of London. Is your “Best Boy” wearing khaki? If not don’t  
YOU THINK he should be? If he does not think you and your country are worth  
fighting for – do you think he is WORTHY of you? Don’t pity the girl who is 
alone – her young man is probably a soldier – fighting for her and her country— 
and for YOU.If your young man neglects his duty to his King and Country, the  
 
                                                 
86 Kingsbury, For Home and Country, 80.  
87  Patricia Hollis, Ladies Elect: Women in English Local Government, 1865-1914 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1987), 471-472. Paraphrased by David Monger in, Patriotism and Propaganda 
in First World War Britain: The National War Aims Committee and Civilian Morale (Liverpool : 
Liverpool University Press, 2012), 79. 
  27
time may come when he will NEGLECT YOU. Think it over – then ask him 
to join the army today88 
 
The text imbued women with the power to dictate gender roles with shame as their tool, and 
clearly associated women with the nation. The message was also clear to any man who happened 
to read the poster: if he did not fight, he was a worthless creature not fit for the love and 
admiration of women. The poster both defined masculinity and gave women the power to 
enforce that definition. The other notable example was less overbearing. Written in a pleasant 
script, the poster read, “To the women of Britain. Some of your men folk are holding back on 
your account. Won’t you prove your love for country by persuading them to go?”89 The message 
is presented in a more positive tone, but the appeal was the same: to recruit women to use their 
love to coerce men to serve. It communicated that men were not fulfilling the obligations of their 
gender as defined by the state, and it enlisted the support of women to enforce these gendered 
obligations.  
To get men to fill British ranks, the state had to appeal and to persuade. Those appeals 
and persuasions were often gendered. Recruitment posters and propaganda used figures and 
messages that conformed to prewar conceptions of masculinity and femininity to convince and 
shame men into fighting. Men were athletic heroes duty bound to protect women, the home, and 
the nation. Often the nation was personified as a woman. In other cases, the state construed the 
fight as a means to protect women and children. Indeed, images of death and destruction were 
blamed, subtly, on the unenlisted man reading the poster. The posters lay the deaths of innocent 
women and the destruction of Britain at the feet of the unenlisted man. Utilizing shame and guilt 
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through an array of images, propaganda posters both reflected and reinforced the gender 
expectations of Britain.   
The poster, however, was just one form of mass visual propaganda. Another major and 
important source of propaganda during World War I was film, which operated under a different 
administrative division with different goals. Comparing film propaganda to poster propaganda 
deepens our understanding of propaganda’s masculine assumptions and of propaganda’s effect 






























































































































3. MASCULINITY IN BRITISH PROPAGANDA FILMS DURING THE FIRST WORLD 
WAR 
 
  The cinema was the other great source of potent mass visual propaganda. Official 
propaganda films, however, differed substantially from propaganda posters. The poster relied on 
stylized art to convince men to enlist or to encourage people to buy war bonds, but the 
propaganda films were largely bereft of such appeals. The logic of shame found in propaganda 
posters did not find its way into British cinemas in quite the same way it did with propaganda 
posters plastered around public space. Film propaganda “was to be factually based, its origins 
were to be kept secret, and it was to be distributed selectively.”90 Realistic content stands in stark 
contrast to the mythic and idealized imagery found on posters. The reasons for the differences 
are numerous, but the most important one was that propagandists created films primarily for 
foreign audiences. The films, however, were also shown in Britain, and they were quite popular. 
There were also independent recruitment films created outside government control that 
resembled the propaganda posters that operated according to a gendered logic of shame. The 
official propaganda films lacked the explicit gendered logic of posters because they were not 
designed for domestic recruitment, but their prescription for a prewar masculinity still existed 
(albeit in a subtler form).  
  The birth of film in Britain can be traced back to February 20, 1896. That was the day the 
French Lumière brothers, the inventors of cinema, first showed films to British audiences at the 
Royal Polytechnic Institute in London.91 The first films were short, usually minute-long, 
demonstrations of moving pictures rather than what we would think of as a proper film. Initially 
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audiences watched films at music halls, but fixed cinemas supplemented music halls over a 
period of time between 1908 and1914.92 This was also the period in which films began to take a 
more narrative driven direction; the commercially successful Rachel’s Sin (1911) prompted other 
filmmakers to follow suit.93 The films shown in Britain were of both domestic and international 
origin, with popular films coming from places outside Britain like the United State and France. 
Prior to 1914, “the cinema… evolved in a free competitive market situation, without 
preconceptions or state interference.”94 The creation of an office for film propaganda ended that 
period of film’s history in Britain, but the first propaganda films actually came from independent 
filmmakers.  
The independent propaganda films did not use actual footage of the front, but utilized 
“old travelogues of Belgium” and staged the rest.95 The filmmakers intended to capture the 
patriotism surrounding the outbreak of war, and “deliberate efforts to arouse a warlike spirit 
included not only the topical dramas, but many elementary ‘recruiting pictures’ shown to the 
accompaniment of military bands with girls in khaki singing patriotic songs and pointing out the 
nearest recruitment office.”96 The recruitment films rely on gendered appeals strongly similar to 
those of the recruitment posters, as do the “topical dramas” albeit to a lesser extent. Because both 
types of these early propaganda films were intended for a domestic, British audience, they rely 
on shaming men to an extent that the official films do not. 
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A common plot in the early propaganda dramas was the threat of invasion. England’s 
Menace, released in September 1914, “vividly illustrates a carefully planned invasion of England 
by the German Navy… Grim realism is imparted to the story by the introduction of fine naval 
spectacles.”97 It was a simple film in which a politician’s daughter discovers her butler is a 
German spy, and uses his information to get her father to stop an invasion. One reviewer said the 
“gripping” drama should “stir up patriotism in the breast of anyone.”98 Many of the propaganda 
films were not so whimsical in their message as England’s Menace, but the film demonstrates 
just how quickly independent filmmakers moved to create propaganda films. The war was hardly 
a month old by the time England’s Menace came out, and it was only the first of many such 
films, each increasing the intensity of its message.  
The German Spy Peril was released shortly after England’s Menace, and it too centers on 
the threat of German invasion. Instead of the German Navy, however, it features a group of 
German spies on a mission to blow up Parliament. This propaganda film is particularly 
important, not only for its message to the male viewer, but because of the event that sets the film 
in motion. The main character, Jack Holmes, walks down the street when he sees a poster of 
Lord Kitchener calling for his service, and “he [Holmes] determines to answer the call.”99 The 
film not only acts as its own propaganda, but it also commanded the male viewer to obey the 
propaganda posters he would surely run into after leaving the theatre. The film continues with 
Jack heading to his nearest recruitment center and intermingling with his fellow enthusiastic 
countrymen. Jack, however, receives a crushing bit of news when the medical officer declares, 
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“You are unfit for service.”100 Jack then leaves the center disheartened, but, as he walks down 
the street, he happens to overhear some German spies discussing their Guy Fawkes-esque plan to 
blow up parliament. Jack follows them on their mission and discovers them with their bomb. 
They capture him, and leave him to die with the bomb. He escapes, but he is unable to diffuse the 
bomb in time. The climax of the movie occurs when Jack reaches the Germans and he shouts, 
“We will die together you German dogs, for my King and my country’s sake!”101 The camera 
lingers on the rubble, leading the viewer to believe Jack has killed himself in defense of the 
realm. The hero, however, emerges from the rubble, wounded but intact. The plot and story were 
almost comically irrelevant to the propaganda message of the film. Not only does the film 
command obedience to poster propaganda, it prescribes the only acceptable way for a man unfit 
for service to prove his worth: find some way to die for Britain. Even reviewers seconded this 
coercive message. One review began by declaring the immediate relevance of the film because 
of an estimated “30,000 Germans in London alone.”102 Any man who viewed the film knew what 
was expected of him, even if he lacked the physical capability.  
October of 1914 witnessed the release of Cecil Hepworth’s Unfit (The Strength of the 
Weak). It, even more explicitly than The German Spy Peril, centered on the duty of men unfit for 
active service. The film journal Bioscope gave this description of the film: “Both brothers wish 
to enlist, only the older is accepted. The younger is ‘unfit.” He goes to the front as a war 
correspondent and in the end gives his life to save his brother for the sake of a girl they both 
love.”103 Again there is the motif of a man unfit for service giving his life anyway. The message 
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was that there should be no escape from one’s duty as a man, even if one could not be a soldier. 
This film also delivered the common image of a man sacrificing himself for a woman. The 
“unfit” protagonist was also portrayed quite heroically. The inverse deduction from the film, of 
course, was that if a man was not willing to sacrifice his life in the war, then he was a coward. 
The element of unrequited love also contributed to a certain propaganda element. The hero of the 
story gave his life to protect the love of a woman who loves another. He lacked the virility 
necessary to truly be a man, but he still embodied “the noble man who would defend a woman’s 
honor.”104   
Other early, independent productions were more explicit about recruitment, and worked 
with the army to bolster enlistment. A notable one from 1914 was England’s Call. Like the 
propaganda posters featuring the image of Lord Nelson demanding every British male to do his 
duty, England’s Call relied on Britain’s glorious past to appeal to men. The film journal 
Bioscope described it as: “A good recruiting picture in which the portraits of Raleigh, 
Wellington, Nelson, and Gordon leave their frames to offer patriotic appeals. Some of our 
modern heroes are introduced.”105. Showings of the film also typically included military bands 
and patriotic songs.106 Recruitment films of this nature continued into 1915. Films like Tommy 
Atkins, based on a play from 1895, showed a plucky young man out to prove himself and 
“straighten out domestic difficulties.”107 The film was shown around the country, and 
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recruitment efforts were increased. During March 1915 in York, “A recruiting officer’s office 
was established in the management offices so that men responding to the call for recruits might 
be at once enrolled.”108 The propaganda film, which showed a young soldier doing his duty, 
propelled the captive audience of young men in the theater into enlistment.  
Like the poster, the medium of film was not utilized as mass propaganda until the 
outbreak of hostilities in 1914, in what M. L. Sanders and Philip Taylor call “undeniably an 
impressive exercise in improvisation.”109 There was no precedent for state-controlled film 
propaganda before the war, but mere weeks after the fighting began Asquith’s government 
created an office for the production of film propaganda, The War Propaganda Bureau.110 Asquith 
tasked liberal politician Charles Masterman with heading the operation. Because Masterman 
used his office at Wellington House to carry out his duties, the term “Wellington House” 
eventually became shorthand for the efforts and conduct of The War Propaganda Bureau. 
Wellington House emerged from the same conditions as the PRC, and posters and films did share 
similarities. However, there were also considerable differences between official propaganda 
films and propaganda posters.  
 The production of such independent propaganda films ceased as Wellington House 
assumed control over film propaganda. Wellington House was a bureau of Asquith’s cabinet. 
This was not the case with the PRC, which operated outside an official propaganda organization 
as a parliamentary body.111 Official propaganda was intended for foreign audiences while 
unofficial propaganda was intended for the domestic population. This distinction between the 
                                                 
108 “’Tommy Atkins’ at York,” Bioscope, April 1, 1915, 4.  
109 M. L. Sanders and Philip M. Taylor, British Propaganda during the First World War, 1914-
1918 (London: MacMillan Press, 1982), 1.  
110 Reeves, Official British Film Propaganda, 2.  
111 Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda during the First World War, 102.  
  44
official propaganda of Wellington House and the unofficial propaganda of the PRC existed 
because Asquith’s government assumed it would be easier to capture popular enthusiasm at 
home.112 Foreign countries, specifically foreign neutral countries, needed more care and attention 
to coax onto the British side of war. Masterman quite clearly stated how he intended to use 
official propaganda: 
 Anything in the nature of an appeal to neutral countries has been rigidly ruled out;  
our activities have been confined to the presentation of facts and of general arguments    
based on those facts. The importance of secrecy need not be labored here. The intrusion 
of a government, or of persons notoriously inspired by government, into the sphere of 
opinion, invariably excites suspicion and resentment…113 
 
Neutral countries would be spared the appeals, but the domestic population would not. Intrusions 
into the domestic Briton’s life would not invite suspicion or resentment. In fact, the 
government’s intrusion into public life was hardly questioned, and state-produced posters hung 
from every street corner, saturating the public sphere with carefully controlled messages.. 
While poster propaganda, unilaterally produced and controlled by the state, was fully part 
of what Althusser calls the “Repressive State Apparatus,” Althusser’s concept of the “Ideological 
State Apparatus” better describes film propaganda. Film propaganda included both independent 
productions and official, government productions, the ISA is diverse and plural, and “the 
mechanism that produces this vital result [interpellation]… is naturally covered up and concealed 
by a universally reigning ideology…”114 This point is particularly salient in light of Masterman’s 
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and Wellington House’s commitment to the pretense of objectivity, and the simultaneous 
commitment to secrecy and deceit.  
Wellington House’s targeted audience was clearly defined: “It was directed at the 
opinion-makers in foreign societies – journalists, publicists, politicians, government officials, 
teachers…”115 The modus operandi of Wellington House was to affect those who could effect 
real change within the targeted country. There was not much point in trying to shame individual 
men from foreign countries into the British military.  
The structure of Wellington House also influenced the content of propaganda films 
because the films’ messages were contingent on Charles Masterman’s ideas about the factual 
film. He was in charge of Wellington House, and he implemented his ideas. Masterman even 
suggested in an article published in The Nation that, if any appeals should be made to working 
men, it should be on the basis of German savagery on the continent.116 Masterman did not like 
emotional appeals, and he believed most people would see right through them. His policies 
would ultimately result in considerably different content from propaganda posters. Masculine 
roles and masculinity still existed in the propaganda films of the war, but the message of shame 
was considerably muted.  
Another feature unique to film was the initial reluctance of the British government to 
deploy film for propaganda purposes. Despite the creation of Wellington House at the beginning 
of the war, no propaganda films were created in the first year of the war. The initial efforts of 
Wellington House were clandestine distribution of literature like books and pamphlets to key 
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figures in foreign governments.117 Furthermore, the vast majority of films and newsreels were 
created after 1916 with the creation of the War Office Cinematography Committee (or WOCC). 
The recognition of film’s usefulness came only after witnessing the success the Germans had 
with film in Romania.118 Two factors explain the delay in film propaganda production. First was 
the state’s distrust of the camera’s “indiscriminating eye.”119 A camera catches all, and the 
propagandists did not have complete control over the content like they did with posters. Film 
captured reality, and, as Lucy Masterman stated in her biography of her husband, there was a 
widespread belief in the upper echelons of Wellington House that film would lead to “every sort 
of secret” escaping.120 Secondly, officials, politicians, and administrators alike looked down on 
film; they “regarded cinema as a shabby means of mass entertainment, totally unworthy of 
serious attention.”121 As Lucy Masterman put it, cinema was a “kind of music hall turn, probably 
vulgar and without serious importance.”122 Curiously, though, the British had an established 
history with the use of film propaganda dating back to 1900. The War Office had been happy to 
consult on films like R. W. Paul’s Army Life, or How Soldiers are Made in 1900. It was much 
the same story until just a year before the war when, in 1913 Keith Prowse made The British 
Army Film.123 These films were not made by the state, but the state and the military did offer 
their co-operation.  
The propaganda films of Wellington House had a decidedly different tone and content. 
Michael Paris shows that the success of the independent propaganda films “awoke” politicians to 
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the usefulness of film as instruction.124 Masterman’s main goal for his propaganda was “aimed at 
getting the United States to enter the war.”125  This was evident in his first official film, Britain 
Prepared, which debuted in London on December 29, 1915.126  The film followed Masterman’s 
prescription that propaganda should be shown to foreign audiences without pretense or appeal. 
Commenting on the film’s “conspicuous…factual approach,” Nicholas Reeves provides a 
description of a typical scene from the film: “The tone was set in the very first film, Britain 
Prepared, where footage of the King visiting a Vickers factory was introduced, not with patriotic 
words celebrating the event, but with the simple words ‘The visit of His Majesty King George V 
to the Ordnance Works of Messrs. Vickers Ltd.’”127 Mastermasn’s philosophy that emotional 
appeals should not be made to foreign nations and the fact the films were primarily created for 
foreign nations explained the adherence to more realistic content.  Wellington House did show 
the official propaganda films in Britain, though. They were exhibited extensively throughout the 
United Kingdom. Most importantly, the propaganda films were successful and widely seen.128    
Britain Prepared, directed by the Anglo-American Charles Urban, was a marathon three 
hours and forty minutes long. It comprised twelve reels, and each reel revolved around a theme. 
Some of the reels centered on simple images showcasing the power of the British military, such 
as reel two, “manufactures of a 15-inch naval gun and firing trials,” or reel nine, “the Grand Fleet 
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at Scapa Flow in the North Sea.”129 These reels most accurately reflect Masterman’s hope that 
“some glimpse of the power and energy of the most powerful of the allies might have its effect 
on neutrals and induce them to remain neutral if hostile, and to throw their lot in with the allies if 
they were friendly.”130 Indeed much of the film dealt with industrial production. According to 
Luke McKernan, “Despite the appearance of new recruits being turned into fighting men, and the 
contributions being made by the women of Britain, it is a film about armaments, not people.”131  
McKernan, however, is too quick to dismiss the film’s gendered messages.  Reel one, 
“Training the New Army,” explored precisely what it meant to be a man during the First World 
War. After the opening credits, two slides elucidated what was to follow: “Britain’s new army. 
How 3 million civilians became efficient soldiers.”132 The film begins with a display of a mass 
public rally, where a speaker standing next to a golden lion gives an impassioned speech to an 
excited audience. The scene cuts at a minute and ten seconds to a scene that treated the viewer to 
scenes of recruitment. The film displays two men stopping to take papers and direction from a 
recruitment officer. The first man, clearly upper class, is very tall, and he wears a black coat and 
a top hat. The next man is squat, and he wears a flat cap with a wool jacket – obviously a worker. 
The message, however, was clear: no matter one’s social standing one was expected to enlist. 
The film then fades to another slide. It reads, “The cheery non-slackers receiving their papers 
and marching to barracks.”133 Not only did the film communicate to the audience that every man 
was expected to enlist, but it also hammered that message home by characterizing any man who 
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did not enlist as a “slacker.” The film intended to shame any man in the audience who 
entertained ideas of shirking his duty.  
The first message of the first reel of the first official propaganda film was about men and 
what a man was supposed to do. Beginning at the three-minute mark, the rest of the film was 
dedicated to how the army turned civilian men into fighting men. The men arrive at the barracks 
and begin to perform physical exercises. The men are a picture of peak physical performance, 
and they exercise as a unit. Then the men change into their uniforms to practice military drills. 
Intended to showcase the power and the energy of the British army--as Masterman wanted—
these scenes also communicated to the male viewer what he was supposed to do if he were fit for 
service. It is rather appropriate that official propaganda films dealt with fit men since the 
unofficial, independent films had already showcased the role for a man unfit for service. In both 
cases, the advice was to fight and die for one’s country.  
The other major film to come out of Wellington House was The Battle of the Somme. 
This film went further than any other in a quest for realism. Two cameramen were sent to France 
to record aspects of the actual Battle of the Somme; their shots included footage of “artillery in 
action, elements of the 29th and 7th divisions moving up, and various facets of the actual attack of 
1 July.”134 A massive success, the film “was not only the most successful propaganda film of the 
war, but arguably the most successful British film of all time.”135 Nearly twenty million Britons 
saw the film in its first six weeks, and it may have been seen by a majority of the United 
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Kingdom’s population. The film premiered in London on the third week in August before 
expanding to the rest of the country a week later.136 The response to the film was 
overwhelmingly positive. The Times stated that it “gave a glimpse not merely of the horror of the 
war but also of its glories.”137 The Manchester Guardian proclaimed, “the real thing at last.”138 
Of course, The Battle of the Somme was not quite the real thing. Like Britain Prepared, the film 
portrays the action as if it were documentary footage, but the scenes were actually staged.  Much 
of the film is devoted to showing off the general prowess of the British military, but it also 
showed the British Army in action. There are scenes of men going over the top, of the cavalry 
charging, and of dead men.  The unemotional approach of The Battle of the Somme makes it 
clear that this film was intended to manipulate other countries into joining or otherwise 
supporting the British side, and not to shame men into enlistment.  
Charles Urban, the director of Britain Prepared, also directed the Battle of the Somme, 
but at five reels, the later film was considerably shorter than its predecessor. (The Battle of the 
Somme was actually considerably longer, but it was condensed and re-edited by the first theatre 
to show it. Urban was furious, but he was able to reuse the omitted footage in shorter films.)139 
The entirety of the film is set on the day before the Battle of the Somme, the day of the battle, 
and the day after. Each reel shows various parts of the British Army’s experience with the battle. 
The first reel shows the Army preparing for an attack, and the slides are truly of an austere 
nature. A typical slide is like the one at nine minutes and nine seconds into the film that reads, 
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“The 4-7 inch guns were giving the enemy no rest.”140 A scene of British bombardment of the 
German position follows, along with men loading and unloading the guns. The men, the soldiers, 
appear little different than cogs in the war machine. This type of imagery continues throughout 
the reel, such as at fourteen minutes and thirty-five seconds when a slide appears announcing, 
“Supply of ‘plum puddings,’ these bombs are most effective in smashing the enemies barbed 
wire entanglements.”141 The reel treats men as little other than auxiliary support for the 
technological weaponry. It is only in the second reel, covering the evening before the battle, that 
some of the men’s humanity comes through. The reel mostly shows men preparing individually 
for battle, trying to rest, or trying to eat. This is also the case at seventeen minutes and forty-three 
seconds when a slide foretells the “Royal Warwickshires having a meal in camp on the evening 
before the great advance.”142 
Reel three of the Battle of the Somme features the attack. It is a thrilling sequence that 
purported to show actual footage of that famous day, July 1, 1916. The film treats the viewer 
right away to a slide that says, “At a signal along the entire 16 mile front, the British troops 
leaped over trench parapets and advanced towards the German trenches under heavy fire of the 
enemy.”143 The film then shows the men dramatically going over the top. The cameramen did 
film such events, but the actual footage never made it to the screen. The scenes watched by 
audiences were fakes; the authorities censored the film because they deemed the actual footage 
“unsuitable for public exhibition.”144 This is important to note because it helps explain why The 
Battle of the Somme contained the least amount of propaganda intended to shame British men. 
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One of the cameramen of the film, Geoffrey Malins, wrote later in his memoir, “Over my head 
all the time, like a huge sword, hung… the opinion of neutral countries. They would accept 
nothing unless there was great excitement in it…”145 The film needed enough real footage to be 
convincing to foreign audiences in places like the United States, but it needed to be manipulated 
in such a way that it did not show what was really happening. It was important that the 
propaganda did not appear to be propaganda. The main goal was to get neutral countries to join 
the fight on the Allied side, not to persuade British men into uniform. The same could have been 
said about Britain Prepared, but Britain Prepared did have sparse, yet strong, elements of 
shaming men into service. The discrepancy is most likely explained by conscription. There had 
been no conscription of British men when Wellington House made Britain Prepared. This was 
not the case with the Battle of the Somme.   
But as 1916 turned into 1917 the so-called “factual films” gave way to the resurgence of 
narrative films. The British public had grown weary of Charles Urban and the American 
presence in British films. The Evening News reported:  
Why [are] Germans and pro-Germans in America are the only people who are allowed in 
that country to make huge profits out of the showing of the British Government war 
films. Are the King’s visit pictures to be placed in the hands of the same group who are 
making fortunes in the United States out of ‘Britain Prepared’ and ‘the Battle of the 
Somme?’ This is an important question demanding an answer from the British Topical  
Committee, which distributes the films all over the world.146 
 
Americans were not making fortunes off of British productions. As McKernan notes, the article 
was “misinformed, malicious, and ignorant of the prices that could be expected of films.”147 
However, perception was important, and the administration of propaganda films underwent 
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significant changes. From October 1916 to February 1917, Wellington House shared propaganda 
film production duties with the Trade Topical Committee (later known as the British Topical 
Committee). In 1917, Lloyd George’s government replaced Wellington House with the 
Department of Information under the direction of novelist John Buchan (the DOI would be 
subsumed by the Ministry of Information under Lord Beaverbrook in 1918). The DOI began 
making radically different propaganda films from the films of Wellington House, and the target 
of the films shifted back to home audiences. Its policy was to make films that were “ninety per 
cent propaganda and ten per cent entertainment.”148 The new propagandists in the DOI 
concluded that films like Britain Prepared and the Battle of the Somme lacked “human interest,” 
and “what was needed was films with the attractiveness and power of a war-story picture with 
human interest…in connection with the war attractively introduced.”149 These films were similar 
to the independent features that had been made in the earliest stages of the war. The return to that 
style also carried a return to renewed propaganda efforts that targeted men and masculinity.  
 Even newsreels became subject to glossier propaganda under the Department and 
Ministry of Information. Unfortunately, nearly all of the newsreels of that latter part of the war 
have been lost, but descriptions of them still exist. One featured shots of British troops in the 
Alps described as, “War amidst the eternal snows. Always happy, never disappointed, Tommy in 
the camps in the Italian Alps has become a fighting mountaineer.”150 They did not, however, 
always have such a cheery message. Two of note demonstrated the horror of the male pacifist. 
One in May of 1918 described a “PACIFIST FIASCO IN LONDON,” and another declared, 
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“NO DEFEATISTS WANTED. Londoners refuse to hear pacifists at Tower Hill.”151 Pacifists 
were male cowards, and these newsreels treated them as if they were pathogens. Men not willing 
to fight were not even worthy of being heard. They were a sickness that had to be cured. The 
majority of the propaganda films made during this era, however, were more explicitly fictional 
films. 
 Many of the films were short and focused on eliminating waste. One notable film was the 
two-minute short Her Savings Saved. It was a short piece encouraging the purchase of war bonds 
in May of 1918. The media has been lost, but the Imperial War Museum kept a record of the film 
and its plot. It depicts a working-class girl as she is out shopping in a street market. As she 
browses the goods, a pickpocket sneaks up and steals a receipt for a National Savings Certificate 
from her purse. A young man witnesses the theft, and runs to catch the thief. After a struggle, the 
man retrieves the certificate and returns it to the girl. She offers it to him in thanks, but he 
declines.152 The lesson was simply that the good citizen should save, but the way the lesson was 
conveyed informed men the fight was far from over. Men needed to protect what the war was 
being fought for.  
 German barbarity was the subject of the Ministry of Information’s 1918 production Once 
a Hun, Always a Hun, “one of the war’s most notorious propaganda films…which played upon 
popular prejudices about the beastly Germans in a way that had not been done before in this 
medium.”153 The film, despite being under three minutes long, has attracted significant attention 
from scholars. The film began with a familiar theme from print propaganda: German soldiers 
brutalizing women and children. Two Germans (or, Stephen Badsey describes them, “baby 
                                                 
151 Ibid. 
152 IWM 533.  
153 Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda during the First World War, 130.  
  55
molesters) harass an innocent woman and her child in her village. The film links the wartime 
Germans with the peacetime Germans that Britain would co-exist with after the war.154 The idea 
was for the British not to trade with the barbarians who had raped women and killed children.155 
The film told men they needed to continue inhabiting the masculine role prescribed for them at 
the outset of the war, even after the fighting had ended. The theme appeared in other films as 
well, such as the feature film The National Film, which centered on a German invasion and 
occupation of Chester.156 How effective this propaganda was at the end of the war is difficult to 
say, but what was evident was that propaganda aimed at the British public relied on notions of 
men as protectors of women. Gender roles were clearly defined.  
 British film propaganda differed from poster propaganda in several ways, particularly the 
films that came from Wellington House. Those films like Britain Prepared and Battle of the 
Somme were intended to arouse sympathy from neutral countries like the United States, and 
convince those countries to join the Allied war effort.  The only films that really mirrored the 
content of the propaganda posters were the independent films made early in the war. Those 
films, like posters, were intended for a domestic audience: their goal was to get men to enlist. 
The later official films of the DOI and MOI contained the elements of masculine gender 
expectations, but the intentions of the later films changed slightly. As the next chapter shows, 
however, films, even the independent films, appear to have been less effective at affecting men’s 
actual sense of masculinity than posters.  
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4. THE IMPACT OF PROPAGANDA’S GENDERED MESSAGES 
Much of the history of British World War I propaganda has focused on production, or on 
propaganda’s social and cultural function. Much less has been written on the impact of British 
World War I propaganda on individuals’ sense of self and their relations to others. Men and 
soldiers in particular were sensitive to the messages conveyed through propaganda because the 
state directed the bulk of propaganda at them. An analysis of World War I diaries, letters, 
newspapers, periodicals, short stories, poetry, and cartoons written by men during or shortly after 
the war reveals that many were deeply affected by propaganda’s gendered logic. The responses 
range from derision to agreement, but one thing is certain: significant numbers of men 
internalized the gendered logic communicated by the state. The state’s propaganda campaign 
strengthened men’s perception of their own masculinity and women’s femininity. The messages 
of men’s role as protectors of women and children, sons defending the motherland, and shame 
should they not fulfill their duty communicated by mass visual propaganda affected men’s 
perception of their gender role and relation to women in British society.   
 Historians who have written on propaganda’s impact typically urge caution. Nicholas 
Hiley argues that the evidence for the impact of poster propaganda at the personal level is far too 
scant to draw meaningful conclusions. He relies on data relating to the frequency at which the 
PRC produced certain posters as the evidence for a poster’s effectiveness and popularity.157 Meg 
Albrinck warns that propaganda’s “messages reflect national ideals but not necessarily actual 
behavior.”158 Despite her urge for caution, however, Albrinck’s concluding sentences offer a 
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framework for how to investigate the evidence that does exist: “Even if the posters did not 
produce the desired results, they were affecting popular concepts of gender identity. Such 
arguments shaped individual perceptions of selfhood and identity during the war years and in the 
postwar years as well.”159 Propaganda called to men with a gendered message. Even when the 
propaganda failed to achieve that goal fully, men still wrestled with a message they internalized 
of state-sanctioned masculinity. 
 Scholarship on film propaganda follows similar lines of caution. In 1983 Nicholas 
Reeves argued that, “The evidence of audience response to films is inconclusive.”160 Returning 
to the question nearly 25 years later, Reeves amended his assessment slightly. He acknowledged 
the popularity and success of propaganda films during the war with audiences, but attributed 
their success to the “novelty” of cinema and the “emotional intensity of the films.”161 He 
concluded, “Opinion in Britain during the First World War was more influenced by the changing 
nature of the war and by people’s own direct, personal experience of the war, than it was by 
official films, or indeed any other form of wartime propaganda.”162 Reeve’s assessment of film 
propaganda is fair, but it fails to recognize that people’s personal experience with the war was 
often filtered through the propaganda that permeated Britain during the war.  
Reeves is correct, however, that official film propaganda made less of an impact on 
people’s (and more specifically for this chapter, men’s) internalization of propaganda messages. 
The gendered messages that appeared in unofficial propaganda were considerably muted in 
official film propaganda. As the previous chapter showed, Wellington House produced official 
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propaganda for foreign audiences and therefore the content of its productions lacked the direct 
appeals of unofficial propaganda. Official propaganda films thus provide little evidence for how 
men internalized the gendered messages of propaganda. 
Nevertheless, even official film propaganda had an impact (minor as it was). Michael 
Hammond has shown how the emphasis on honor and depictions of enlisted men appealed to 
audiences.163 The films both entertained viewers and provided a sense of relief for the audience 
by “ennobling the enlisted soldier.”164 Hammond focuses on domestic audiences and does not 
provide much information on the films’ impact upon recruitment or male viewers’ sense of 
masculinity, but a report of a showing of Wellington House’s Britain Prepared provides a brief 
glimpse into the male viewers’ responses. In 1916, the film was shown to troops on leave in 
Holland.  According to one reporter in attendance, the soldiers reserved their loudest applause for 
scenes “portraying the inspection of troops by King George.”165 The scene in question portrayed 
the king inspecting troops in training, and it is not clear whether the troops were applauding 
themselves, the king, or both.  Fitness was an essential part of the message of masculinity in 
propaganda. A reviewer for the Nottingham Evening Post praised the opening scene of 
“recruiting sergeants in Whitehall picking up fine specimens of young manhood.”166 The 
reviewer describes what the film called “cheery non-slackers” as the fine specimens of young 
manhood. Britain Prepared does not, however, appear in soldier’s letters home or diaries; it 
inspired no poems or caustic quips.  
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Wellington House’s most important film production, The Battle of the Somme, also 
apparently failed to resonate deeply with soldiers and young men. Sources that explore the 
gendered messages of the film tend to do so out of a sense of home-front catharsis. A film 
reviewer from the north of England expresses the anxiety he felt at seeing depictions of fallen 
soldiers, but then he describes relief when he sees some boys returning and looking like “they 
just returned from a football match.”167 In Michael Hammond’s analysis, home front viewers like 
this one needed to “envelop the living figures in smiles and a masculine tradition of home.”168 
He provides another example of a review from The Star published on August 25, 1916. The 
reviewer talks of the heroic soldiers giving cigarettes to “demented German Prisoners,” which 
Hammond writes is the reviewer “construct[ing] the British soldiers as an idealized masculinity 
while the Germans are…pathetic, vanquished villains.”169 Hammond’s study helps to explain 
why the films did not play prominently in soldiers’ constructions of masculinity. While the films 
were popular in Britain, they operated as education for the home front and as a “practical 
patriotism.”170 The films were not specifically designed to speak to soldiers and the unenlisted 
man. Indeed, a man writing shortly after the war proclaimed they probably did more harm than 
good:  “few of them [official propaganda films] could have … inspired them [young men] to 
achieve victory at any cost.”171  
Few contemporary writers expressed similar sentiments about propaganda posters. Both 
during the war years and in the interwar decades, Britons testified to the poster’s effectiveness 
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and how it inspired and influenced men. Hiley, however, argues that propaganda posters did not 
capture the British imagination during the war, and that their popularity was an invention of later 
critics. Hiley argues that posters like the well-known 1915 Savile Lumley poster that asked the 
male viewer, “Daddy what did YOU do during the War?”  are “famous because we want them to 
be famous, not because they give us access to the dominant emotions of the recruiting 
campaign.”172 The posters, in essence, only became famous because they resonated with later 
critic’s distaste for the war. Jim Aulich and John Hewitt have continued this line of argument. 
They state that the Lumley poster specifically was “not seen at the time as being particularly 
significant,” and that “as an example of manipulative sentimentality it achieved a certain 
notoriety after the war during a period that was less jingoistic and more critical of the 
conflict.”173 Certainly it remained popular after the war. George Orwell mused in 1940,  “I have 
often laughed to think of that recruiting poster, ‘What did you do in the Great War, daddy?’ (a 
child is asking this question of its shame-stricken father), and of all the men who must have been 
lured into the army by just that poster and afterwards despised by their children for not being 
Conscientious Objectors.”174 But those sentiments existed during the war as well. In 1915 the 
Scottish Labor Party politician Robert Smillie quipped to a reporter, should his daughter ever 
pose to the question to him, “I tried to stop the bloody thing my child.”175 A closer examination 
of contemporary sources reveals Hiley’s, Aulich’s, and Hewitt’s conclusions to be overstated.  
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The Lumley poster appears many times in a diverse set of sources from men throughout 
Britain during the war. Thomas Macmillan recounted in his memoir, “It happened frequently ‘on 
the field’ after the completion of an unpleasant job-of-work, that my comrades would turn to 
each other and ask in derision: ‘Daddy what did you do in the Great War.”176 Macmillan’s 
memory is important for several reasons. First and most obviously, it shows that the question 
posed by the supposedly insignificant poster saturated an entire group of soldiers as a relief joke 
for their harsh conditions. The troops mocking derision also highlights how the poster informed 
their perception of their masculinity. Their answer to the question could not be what it was 
intended to be. They could not tell their daughters that they were heroic protectors of England. 
They could only tell their daughters the unpleasant details they would not want to share; that they 
were menial laborers who performed tasks like digging trenches and clearing dead bodies.  
The poster and its question appeared in many articles and editorials. The Western Mail 
posed the question to its readers in 1918, and published a few of the responses. The responses 
stressed “vital… fighting men,” and one respondent stated, “We stopped what we could, good 
and quick, my son.”177 The response indicated the man did his duty, just as England expected. 
The Stirling Observer anonymously published a father’s letter from the front to his children 
explaining exactly what he was doing. He wrote, “My Dear Boys and Girls… Altogether there 
are thousands of us helping in numberless ways in this great struggle for Freedom and Liberty. 
Soon we shall have peace, as the Germans are getting weaker everyday, while we are growing 
stronger everyday.”178 The letter seemed to reassure all that every man was struggled and fought 
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as best he could to protect little boys and girls. The Morpeth Herald reported on a Mr. Heatly 
who asked the whole town of Blyth what they were doing during the war. His speech was one of 
compassion for the wounded sons of Blyth who had “followed the battle cry of Nelson when he 
exclaimed ‘England expects everyman to do his duty.”179 It appears Mr. Heatly was inspired by 
more than one piece of propaganda. But by far the most illuminating piece of evidence was an 
anonymous article written by a soldier about what it meant to be a man in the war. 
Another, more idiosyncratic article that referenced the poster appeared in the Folkestone, 
Hythe, Sandgate & Cheriton Herald.  Titled “Men’s Meeting at the Drill Halls,” the article began 
with a straightforward report on a speech given by the Bishop of Dover. A few sentences in, 
however, the piece switched to first person and the author gives a very personal account of his 
take on why men enlisted. When the author begins talking in the first person he states:  
In the early days of the war we grew very familiar with the posters on the hoardings 
calling upon men to join the Army in the days of their county’s need. Amongst them was 
one… bearing the words “Daddy, What did you do during the great war?” We all know 
how that demand had been answered, and probably when historians writing at a later date 
one of the first things they would speak of would be the magnificent voluntary response 
of five million men to the country’s call.180 
 
The author specifically remembered this specific poster, and he associated it with actually 
motivating men to enlist. He goes on to discuss the valor of the men who died, and attributes 
their heroic deaths to defense of the homefront. He then describes overhearing some soldiers 
discussing the greatest victory of the war, and tells of a man who gave the best answer: “One 
man said the greatest victory there could be was the victory of a man in his own heart over his 
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own senses. That was the truth.”181 The greatest victory was to be an honorable, Christian soldier 
who fought despite his fear. This assessment of a man’s greatest victory was directly tied to the 
propaganda poster’s use of shame as a motivating tool for enlistment. There was nothing worse 
than being a coward, or perhaps being perceived as a coward by one’s children or women. 
Women do enter into the article near the end in the context of male-female social relations: “Men 
had felt it such a hard fight that they had established the idea of a double standard for men and 
women…. At any rate, men did care a great deal about the opinions of other people, and what 
they thought and said of them.”182 The article is not explicitly clear on what the specific gender 
double standard was, but it is clear that it came about because of the hard fight men faced and 
people’s opinion of men going off to fight. The most significant aspect of the article, however, 
was that all of the author’s thoughts sprung from how he internalized the Lumley propaganda 
poster. It may be correct the poster rose to greater fame after the war due to its association with 
disenchantment and disillusionment, but clearly the poster resonated with observers, men and 
soldiers specifically, during the war. Moreover, the poster appears successful in communicating 
a gendered message of masculinity and dutiful honor to the male observer.  
The Lumley poster was not the only successful poster that appears in contemporary 
sources. The first chapter provided evidence for the widespread existence and success of 
Kitchener’s poster, but other posters also deeply affected men. An article in The Manchester 
Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser detailed the success of the “Women of Britain say 
GO Poster!” This poster came at the end of the voluntary recruitment period and represented the 
state’s most coercive propaganda efforts. The article discusses the success of a series of posters, 
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and asserts that “the most attractive is one containing the message: ‘Women of Britain say 
GO!’183 Expressing  “astonishment at the young men attending the picture houses and places of 
amusement,” the article’s author insisted that “young single men should recognise their 
responsibility”—and thus echoed the poster’s message of shame. 184  The Exeter and Plymouth 
Gazette also affirmed that message in its description of how the poster urges women to shame 
men into service: “It is realised by everyone that the women of England can, if they use their 
influence right, become powerful recruiting agents…Woman’s persuasive powers are well-
know, and since the days of Adam she has been able to twist man around her little finger.”185 If 
men could not be appealed to via masculine heroism, then they would be shamed as cowards by 
women. Women shaming men had been a propaganda tactic since Admiral Charles Penrose 
“encouraged women to hand white feathers to every able-bodied man who was not wearing 
khaki,” but the poster represented the state’s efforts to mobilize every British woman in helping 
shame men into a prescribed masculine role.186 Michael MacDonagh recalled watching two 
women running up to two men in London and saying, “Why don’t you fellows enlist? Your king 
and country want you. We don’t.”187 While this poster came at the end (or failure, as some might 
see it) of the PRC’s propaganda campaign, the poster was a success at using women to shame 
men into their proper role.  
A few men were very aware of the ways in which the state tried to manipulate them into 
doing their ‘duty’. The work of writer Arthur Graeme West is a good example of a middle class 
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man coming to the realization that propaganda was little other than an empty promise, meant to 
coerce and shame. West was educated at Blundell’s school and Balliol College, Oxford before 
joining the war. He was unusual among the war poets. Unlike poets like Siegfried Sassoon and 
Rupert Brooke, for example, West held deep ethical reservations about enlisting to fight, and he 
detested the “attitudes instilled in and adopted by his fellow soldiers.”188 It is not exactly clear 
what compelled him to join, but he did enlist and his writings are very critical about the attitudes 
held by men at the front. His posthumously published diary and poetry were filled with 
condemnations of the gendered messages spewed by propaganda. His poetry and diary entries 
provide evidence for what the ordinary soldier said and thought. West wrote poems with titles 
like “God! How I Hate You, You Young Cheerful Men!” His contempt stands in stark contrast to 
something like the opening scene of Britain Prepared where the young men are described as 
cheery non-slackers. Inverting the gendered tropes of propaganda was unsurprising given what 
he wrote in his diary:  
My feeling of impotent horror, as a creature caught by the proprietors of some  
travelling circus and forced with formal brutality to go through meaningless tricks, 
was immensely sharpened by a charcoal drawing…called “We Want More Men!” 
showing Death, with the English staff cap on and a ragged tunic, standing with a 
jagged sickle among a pile of bleeding, writhing bodies and smoking corpses – a  
huge gaunt figure that haunted me horribly.189  
 
The caricature of a propaganda poster, one that showed Britain did not want more men for their 
masculine heroism or to protect women and children, helped attune West to the reality of his 
situation. It was what led him more fully to the realization that the beliefs of his fellow man were 
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shallow lies propagated by the state. In “God! How I Hate You, You Young Cheerful Men!” 
West writes that he partly hates the young men for the “tears of [their] mothers.”190  
 In his diary, West wrote that his fellow men enlisted to fight because of the appeals 
crafted by the government: “This is the dismal part of it: that these men, almost the best value in 
the ordinary upper class, should allow themselves to suppose that all this is somehow necessary 
and inevitable… to the plain appeals of poverty and inefficacy in government.”191 He showed his 
contempt for men who never questioned their motives for enlisting and bitterly wrote, “Why 
should he? Every man, woman and child is taught to regard him as a hero.”192 The use of the 
passive voice is interesting, and it raises the question of who taught every man, woman, and 
shield to regard the average soldier as a hero. The answer, partly, was the state’s propaganda 
campaign. The propaganda campaign utilized and amplified the masculine ideas that existed 
before the war. West was critiquing this attitude, but that attitude was reinforced and amplified 
by the propaganda appeals made by the state.  
West may have realized the lies sold to soldiers, but most of them were not willing to 
question the message themselves because they knew those at home would regard them as heroic, 
masculine protectors even if that were not the reality. Despite West’s self-awareness, however, 
he was not able to escape feelings of shame for the anti-war beliefs he held. In his poem 
“Spurned by the Gods” he wrote: “The burden of intolerable shame/ That thou has bound on me, 
thou wilt not touch/ to Lighten with thy finger – “193 Even though he knew the state’s 
                                                 
190 Arthur Graeme West, ““God! How I Hate You, You Young Cheerful Men!” Cross, The Lost 
Voices of World War I, 69.  
191 Arthur Graeme West, The Diary of a Dead Officer, in Cross, The Lost Voices of the World 
War I, 68.  
192 Ibid. 
193 Arthur Graeme West, The Diary of a Dead Officer, The Diary of a Dead Officer, Being the 
Posthumous Papers of Arthur Graeme West (London: Allen & Unwin, 1918): 91.  
  67
propaganda message was demagoguery at its worst, the feeling of shame reinforced at every 
street corner in England lodged in West’s mind. He describes “half-ashamedly” the feelings “that 
the war was really very silly, and we all ought to go home.”194  
 West’s self-awareness, however, was atypical, and many soldiers celebrated the gendered 
messages of propaganda. One poem that serves as the antithesis of West’s work comes from a 
collection titled Made in the Trenches: Composed Entirely from Articles & Sketches Contributed 
by Soldiers, several hundred pages of poems, sketches, cartoons, and stories, contributed by 
average British soldiers from the various fronts. R. W. Campbell’s poem entitled “The Making 
of Mickey McGhee” celebrated propaganda as a didactic enterprise. “The Making of Mickey 
McGhee” tells the story of an unscrupulous Scotsman. The poem was accompanied with an 
introductory sketch drawn by Campbell that showed the derelict Mickey McGhee with his an 
arm across his chest and turned to a “Your Country Needs You” poster. Mickey had no patriotic 
feelings of honor or duty; the dirty Scotsman was more interested in “drinking the stuff that 
burneth, and courting the women called ‘Tails.’”195 Mickey did enlist, but not because his 
country needed him. He enlisted “for ale, for sleep, and for bed.”196 The author repeats this 
several times, describing Mickey as a rebel “Who’d only come for drink and bread, and not for 
the soul of the drums.”197 Quickly, however, Mickey learned the true way to be a British man. 
Once he dressed in tartan and began to march, Mickey began “to learn the valour of heroes, the 
glory there is in doom, and how the sons of Princes and Peers are pals of men like he.”198 Despite 
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turning his back to the pleas of propaganda, Mickey came to learn all of its messages were true. 
He learns to “play the game like a sportsman,” and he then fought gloriously side-by-side with 
his sergeant, a Duke.199 Mickey and the Duke, or the “Peer and the Pauper” as Campbell named 
them, go out heroically at the Battle of Mons: “Thus the Peer and the Pauper died, linked in the 
sleep of glory – the death that’s an Empire’s pride.”200 Mickey did not heed the propaganda’s 
call because he believe it to be true, but in an ironic twist of fate, he learned the truth of the 
gendered messages of propaganda posters – heroism, playing the game, honor, and dying for his 
country. The poem ends by telling the reader about one of Mickey’s girl back home named 
Sarah. When she learns of his death she cries, but she is happy to know of her man’s valiant 
death. Sarah’s noble grief is another prize for Mickey: “Her pride is a silver medal, a letter and a 
statement of pay.”201 The poem described something in more explicit terms than usual. It 
informed the reader that Mickey’s fulfillment of the role prescribed by propaganda would earn 
him the sexual desire of women, even in death. Even though the women of Britain told men to 
go, going to fight, and sometimes dying, was the only way to earn the respect and love of 
women.  
Not all of the images of women in Made in the Trenches were so positive, and some of 
the contributed material showed what men might find if they survived the war. A poem by J. P. 
Ede showcased a group of soldiers who had done everything they were told. The poem is a 
presentation of model soldiers of whom “not a man has strayed;” each soldier dutifully follows 
orders even if the order is for a menial task like going “down on hands and knees to scrub the 
Administrative Block.” The poem was just a fairly straightforward telling of men following 
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orders, and doing as they are told. It would be completely unremarkable it not for the final 
stanza: “Many a wife in days to come/ When strife at length is o’er/ Complacently will sit and 
watch/ Her hubby scrub the floor/ And as he slices carrots and removes potato eyes, she’ll 
murmur, “War is, after all, a blessing in disguise.”202 The poem conveys the sense that, far from 
being celebrated as a source of manly authority, the war will emasculate men and make them 
subservient to women. Some men feared while they were fighting at the front women were 
moving into male roles. Instead of women being temporary men for the duration of the war, men 
would become permanent women. This contempt and fear is found elsewhere in the book, most 
notably in a cartoon sketch. The sketch was titled “Administrating angel smoothing the pillow of 
a wounded hero,” but it depicts anything but. The nurse is large and leaning over a frail and 
broken man. Rather than soothing a patient it appeared she was smothering him with a pillow. 
The nurse is putting all her weight onto the pillow over the patient’s head, feathers are flying 
everywhere, and the wounded soldier is telling the nurse to “come off it!”203 The poem and the 
cartoon showcase a feeling that the war did anything but create masculine heroes. Rather the war 
robbed them of their masculinity.  
Although Made in the Trenches was created to raise funds for wounded soldiers, the 
rhetoric surrounding wounded soldiers in the book reveals the attitude that broken men were not 
men at all. The opening page states there is “no more lamentable and pathetic a figure than a 
paralyzed soldier… One is apt to associate such helplessness with extreme old age or with the 
final phase of some exhausting illness; but here is a man in the very flower of his youth, 
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bedridden possibly for life…”204 A central message of the book was that wounded men had done 
what had been demanded of them by the public, and the public ought to do more to take care of 
those the war discarded. In the first story, “The Blighty Squad,” the author quotes a propaganda 
poster as evidence for why the public should do more to help. He said each and every soldier 
‘”had done his bit’ plainly and to the proof of broken body and limb.”205 These attitudes are 
unsurprising given the weight propaganda posters and films like the German Spy Peril and 
Britain Prepared placed on health and physical fitness. 
The mixture of pity and contempt for the disabled expressed by the editor of Made in the 
Trenches was a sentiment that appeared in the letters and diaries of soldiers. Fitness was a 
recurrent theme in both poster and film propaganda, and men often wrote about their feelings of 
health and vitality, or lack thereof. Sometimes these feelings would be directly related to the 
message of propaganda. Fred Albright, while on leave, described Hertford as devoid of able-
bodied men and disgusting because of it: “Now that the able-bodied men are all away to war the 
population at home seems usually weak and diseased.”206 Albright expresses contempt for able-
bodied men, but he also assumed every man left in Hertford was disabled. He considered the 
unenlisted man, regardless of his health, disabled, and his weakness infected the town. It is 
impossible to say if propaganda affected Albright’s view of health, fitness, and masculinity, but 
attitudes like his were common and sometimes directly connected to propaganda.  
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The Rev. J. Reid Howatt wrote in 1915, “One poster has taken grip of me. A handsome 
young fellow… holding his bayoneted rifle in the one hand and pointing to a wasted land with 
the other, is saying ‘come and do your bit. JOIN NOW.’ It is the ‘JOIN NOW’ that burns in 
me.”207 The cleric was deeply affected by the call to arms made by the poster, and he thinks of 
all the poor “murdered women and babes” he could not save.208 But his greatest pity is for the 
unhealthy and disabled: “‘Join NOW.” This may be a simple poster to many who read these 
lines. They have the good heart, mean well, and have long cherished the good intention, but how 
many of the poor wee cripples of London still struggle, still languish in their loneliness.”209 He 
read the lines, which filled him with vitality and the urge to protect women and children. He can 
hardly imagine what it would be like to be a poor disabled wretch unable to become the 
handsome man on the poster. All the disabled man could do was “languish in loneliness,” which 
implies the cripple, unable to enlist, would never find the love of a woman.  
The theme expressed by Howatt was popular with writers. Two stories written during and 
immediately after the war illustrate the link between poster propaganda, fitness, and masculinity. 
In E. M. Bryant’s “His Call to Arms,” published in Windsor Magazine, the main character, 
known simply as the City clerk, is out with his wife. After looking at a poster of Kitchener 
calling for men, the clerk declares his desire to join. He discloses this to his wife, but she replies, 
“Well, at all events, he won’t want you.”210 Her response can be understood two ways. First, he 
is her husband and his duty is to her rather than the front. The second, though, is he is too weak. 
He’s confronted everyday with posters on his way to work, but he feels weak. To strengthen 
                                                 
207  J. Reid Howatt, “The Crutch and Kindness League,” Quiver 50 (August, 1915): 873.  
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid., 874. 
210 E. M. Bryant, “His Call to Arms,” Windsor Magazine, 817 
  72
himself for service he begins to exercise.211 After weeks turn to months, he begins to feel 
extreme guilt for not yet having enlisted. The story comes to a climax when his friend is killed at 
the front. A “fury shook the City clerk to his inmost being, and with it came a fierce, 
uncontrollable joy – joy that he was a man, with a man’s free heritage to avenge wrong.”212 At 
that moment he decides he’s fit enough to enlist. He walks to the door, but his wife blocks the 
way. The City clerk expects her to try and stop him, but she merely asks to walk with him to the 
recruitment office.213 She understands his need to fulfill his masculine duty. The second story 
comes from J. William Locke’s serial novel The House of Balthazar, published in installments 
during and immediately after the war.  Chapter 18 appeared in Nash’s and Pall Mall Magazine in 
October, 1918. Balthazar, and a strange man, acts on whims. At one point in the story, Balthazar 
saw the “urgent demands for man-power,” but felt “oppressed by his sense of physical fitness” 
because he was in his fifties.214 Despite his feelings, he, “in one of his Gordian-knot-cutting 
moods, marched into a recruiting office and vaunted his brawn and muscle. ‘I’m fifty,’ he said, 
‘but I defy anybody to say I defy anybody to say I’m not physically equal to any boy of twenty-
five.’ But they had politely laughed at him and sent him away raging furiously.”215 He mocks the 
men of twenty-five as mere boys, while he envisions himself as the peak of masculinity and 
fitness. The recruiting officers do not share the sentiment, and he is laughed away as a weak old 
man.  
Propaganda had a significant effect on men’s sense of masculinity. Print propaganda, 
however, loomed much larger in the male mind than film propaganda. In the case of official film 
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propaganda it is not surprising that film made a small impact. Despite being seen by a huge 
number of Britons, the films followed Charles Masterman’s philosophy of the “factual film,” and 
foreign audiences were the object of the film’s persuasion. It is more surprising that the 
independent propaganda films did not resonate more deeply with men. They contained the same 
logic of propaganda posters, and the posters definitely affected men. References to films like 
England’s Menace or The German Spy Peril in relation to men’s sense of identity are rare. The 
most likely explanation is those films were not the only ones playing in cinemas, and one had to 
physically go to the cinema to see any propaganda film. There was no choice in regard to 
posters, and that was likely what made them such a potent form of propaganda. The poster, 
contrary to the arguments made by Nicholas Hiley, were powerful sources of influence for the 
viewing subject. They acted like Althusser’s policeman, and when the posters’ call created 
















 By October 1918, Lloyd George’s Liberal government began dismantling what was left 
of Britain’s propaganda apparatuses. Several officials had considered the option of continuing 
propaganda work after the war ended, but with peace in sight the production and distribution of 
both domestic and foreign propaganda ended.216 The four years of wartime propaganda, 
however, had left an impression on British men and their conception of masculinity. There were 
several groups responsible for producing propaganda, each with its own agenda and goals. The 
two main forces responsible for the bulk of British propaganda were the Parliamentary 
Recruitment Committee, and Wellington House. The two organizations were divided according 
to the need for official and unofficial propaganda. Wellington House was an official government 
body that produced propaganda films for foreign audiences, while the PRC was a division of 
parliament (and therefore unofficial) that produced propaganda posters for a domestic audience. 
The two organizations shared some overlap in the content of their propaganda, but they were 
more different than similar. It was ultimately poster propaganda that had the greatest effect on 
men and masculinity.  
 Poster propaganda came out of necessity. Britain had an all-volunteer army, and it needed 
ways to convince men to enlist. The poster was one such way the British state achieved that goal. 
The poster served other purposes than just enlistment, and organizations like the National War 
Aims Committee used the poster to help strengthen national morale.217 It was the recruitment 
posters, though, that relied most heavily on messages of masculinity. The masculine messages on 
the recruitment posters took many forms, and not all of them explicitly relied on tactics like 
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shame or humiliation. Many of them made appeals to men based on a sense of heroism or duty to 
Britain. Although these posters were subtler, there was still an element of coercion that 
reinforced negative gender roles and stereotypes. If the man who enlisted was a hero doing his 
duty, then the man who refused to enlist was still a coward. The elements of a Victorian and 
Edwardian understanding of masculinity ran through the posters.   
 Posters such as E. J. Kealy’s “Women of Britain say GO!” represented how propaganda 
could amplify and then reinforce masculine gender roles. The poster depicts a woman in a 
window directing male public life. It is the heroic man going off to protect the home, but it is 
also women enforcing masculinity. Moreover, it was one of the few specific posters that 
contemporaries made reference to in regard to masculinity. Often when people refereed or 
recalled propaganda it was in the abstract, or they would quote a common theme that showed up 
across many pieces of propaganda such as “do your duty” or he “did his bit.” The Kealy poster, 
however, inspired impassioned pleas to men to leave the country and protect women: “appeal to 
their sense of manliness, their love of country, and that innate respect which exists in all true 
Britishers.”218 If that did not work then the author suggested women use shame and the threat of 
sexual exclusion: “If, however, they continue in their old routine unashamed, and show no 
inclination to do their duty, show them plainly and unmistakably that you do not wish to 
continue their acquaintance further… [they] are unworthy the friendship of loyal, true-hearted, 
clean-minded British women.”219 The poster was a motivating force for women to police 
masculinity, and the poster would not have existed without the war. This was an extreme case 
where propaganda reinforced male gender roles with prejudice. The poster also represented a 
fear that “many men felt threatened by the perception that war had liberated women at their 
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expense.”220 Men’s relationship to the poster, however, was filtered through the perception of 
women.  
 The Lumley poster was the best example of how propaganda aimed to exploit already 
existing codes of masculinity. It was also important for another reason. The poster’s fame and 
significance was not an invention of later critics. It did resonate with men, and it did influence 
how they saw themselves. The author of the article “Men’s Meeting at the Drill Halls,” in the 
Folkestone, Hythe, Sandgate & Cheriton Herald was the best example. His answer to the 
question “Daddy, what did you during the war?” was “the magnificent voluntary response of five 
million men to the country’s call.”221 The author also perceived the strengthening of masculine 
gender roles by the pressure propaganda like the Lumley poster placed on men. The idea that 
men were to be athletic protectors was taken to extremes. Men were, for the first time, being 
asked by the millions to risk their lives to fulfill their masculine duty. The article fits well with 
Louis Althusser’s idea of interpellation. The individual became the subject of the poster’s 
ideology. He was one of the five million men who answered the poster’s call. 
 Few written sources contain direct references to specific pieces of propaganda. Instead 
we see men tended to use propaganda as a corollary to discussion about an issue related to 
masculinity. This was evident in Made in the Trenches, particularly on the topic of fitness. The 
soldiers created Made in the Trenches to help other soldiers wounded in the war, yet many of the 
contributions expressed disgust at and contempt for the disabled. The disgust and contempt was 
in line with the attitude towards those who were not fit, but the story The Blight Squad in Made 
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in the Trenches raised the point that the soldier had “done his bit.” 222  In other words, an 
otherwise able-bodied man had sacrificed his fitness doing his duty as a man. Similar attitudes 
appeared in stories found in periodicals. In His Call to Arms the City clerk exercises to bring his 
fitness up to the military standards he sees in propaganda posters on his way to work. Eventually 
his friend’s death inspires him to enlist, and instead of his wife preventing him from going to the 
recruitment office she walks him there. His fit body was a replacement for his friend’s, and his 
wife encouraged his decision to fulfill his masculine duty.  
 Print propaganda’s ability to resonate with men raises the problem of why film 
propaganda did not, or at least why it did not resonate with men as successfully. The answer in 
part rested with the administrative structure of Wellington House. It was an official government 
division dedicated to swaying the support of neutral, foreign nations towards the British war 
effort. Charles Masterman was also the head of Wellington House and his propaganda 
philosophy precluded the use of appeals or coercive tactics. The results were films that became 
incredibly popular in Britain, but lacked the many--although not all-- of the elements that made 
poster propaganda resonate with men and soldiers.  Britain Prepared begins with a recruitment 
scene that refers to the recruits as “cheery non-slackers.” Scenes like this helped to amplify 
masculinity and men’s role, but they did not reinforce them because they were not largely aimed 
at British men. The propaganda films were created out of the same social and cultural conditions 
as the posters so it is unsurprising that they would contain at least some references to essential 
components of masculinity like fitness or duty. It was just that the message of fitness and duty 
                                                 
222 Boyd Cable, “The Blighty Squad,” in Made in the Trenches: Composed Entirely from Articles 
& Sketches Contributed by Soldiers, ed. Sir Frederick Treaves and George Goodchild (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1916): 20.  
  78
was not the primary message, nor was it being used to convince men to contribute to the war 
effort.  
 Complicating matters further was the independent film propaganda. The films’ content 
shared much more similarity with the poster than with the official film propaganda. The 
independent propaganda films’ target was the domestic audience, the films amplified prewar 
masculinity male gender expectations, and the films used appeals and coercive techniques. Films 
like The German Spy Peril and The Strength of England were essentially moving propaganda 
posters. But they show up even less than the official films in the primary source material. The 
only reference to an independent propaganda film came from a former Oxford student who went 
to see The Man Who Stayed at Home and commented that he was “really quite amusing” and that 
“I enjoyed myself very much.”223 It appeared Lord Northcliffe was wrong when he observed, 
“No one can forget what he has seen happen on the screen.”224  
 There are several explanations for why the independent films failed to resonate on a 
significant level with men. The independent propaganda films popularity gave way to the factual 
films of Wellington House in 1915, and audiences wanted real glimpses of what was happening 
with the war (and audiences were under the impression the films were real). The independent 
films were numerous, but they never reached levels of ubiquity like the posters or a film like 
Battle of the Somme. They were also competing with other non-propaganda films at the cinema. 
Cinemas did not exclusively show propaganda films. But perhaps the most important difference 
was that men had to physically go to a designated area to experience the propaganda films. They 
were not playing on the sides of trams or in Trafalgar Square. 
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